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not to judge whether any particular “debater” was right or wrong. Rather, the intent is to 
consider the debate itself. While problem definition may seem a less-than-ambitious 
undertaking, it is nonetheless necessary for understanding the root causes and conduct of 
war over the last two centuries, as well as for the understanding of possible forms of 
future conflict. In some cases the differences between the debaters are apparent. In others, 
the differences are subtle. The conclusion summarizes the debates and addresses 
underlying themes or patterns that were identified during the course of this research. Last, 
some possible future strategic debates are identified, along with some topics that may 
require further research. 
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I. JOMINI VS. CLAUSEWITZ 
Issue: What, if any, are the rules and principles of war? 
Baron Antoine Henrí de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz were two of the most 
influential military thinkers produced by the Napoleonic experience. The extent of their 
legacy is evidenced by the fact that their seminal treatises on military strategy, Vom 
Kriege (On War) by Clausewitz and Précis de l’Art de la Guerre (Art of War) by Jomini, 
remain part of the professional education of military officers around the world. Despite 
the fact that Jomini and Clausewitz were born within a year of each other (1779 and 
1780, respectively) and were witness to the radical shifts in the political and military 
order of Europe during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, they interpreted 
their experiences quite differently. Though they never met personally, Jomini and 
Clausewitz were aware of each other’s writings and refuted each other to some degree in 
their main treatises. In particular, Jomini’s notion of immutable principles of war did not 
sit well with Clausewitz. Meanwhile, Jomini quipped that those who could not accept the 
principles of war, particularly regarding his concept of decisive points, “may well despair 
of ever comprehending strategy.”1 While Clausewitz argued that war was too complex an 
activity to be reduced to scientific principles, Jomini warned against ignoring the 
principles.   
Yet, it would be an over-simplification to say that Clausewitz and Jomini were 
polar opposites. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the central premise or principle 
in each man’s argument and then assess the extent to which they actually disagreed. Both 
Clausewitz and Jomini wrote their treatises after a lifetime of military service, during the 





                                                 
1 Baron De Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G.H. Mendel and W.P. Craighill (El Paso, TX: El Paso 
Norte Press, 2005), 55. 
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BARON DE JOMINI 
 Born in Vaud, Switzerland in 1779, Antoine Henri de Jomini was ten years old 
when the French Revolution began. Though he was excited and intrigued by news of the 
Revolution, Jomini seemed headed for an established career in banking, rather than in the 
military.2  At the age of seventeen, Jomini had his first opportunity to observe French 
troops in action near Basel, where he had been working as a banker’s apprentice. Over 
the next two years, Jomini furthered his finance career as a trader in Paris, though his 
interest in military affairs deepened as he followed the developments of General 
Napoleon Bonaparte’s campaign in Italy. Following the Swiss Revolution in 1798, 
Jomini abandoned banking and finance for a military career, first as an administrator in 
the newly formed Helvetic Republic, and then in the French military, beginning in 1801. 
In 1805, he was assigned as aide-de-camp to French army General Ney’s staff.3 By the 
time Jomini turned thirty-four in 1813, he had attained the rank of brigadier general, and 
had served as an officer on the General Staffs of Ney and Napoleon during numerous 
campaigns, including Ulm, Jena, Eylau, Russia, and the Peninsular War. That same year, 
Jomini left the France to join the Russian Army, initially as an advisor to Alexander I. 
Despite Jomini’s seeming defection, Napoleon excused his transgression and maintained 
Jomini’s commission in the French Army.4 Promoted to general in the Russian army in 
1826, Jomini served as military advisor to Nicholas I and later helped establish the 
Military Academy in Moscow in 1832.5 In 1837, he published his seminal military 
treatise, Précis de l’art de la guerre (Summary of the Art of War), in Paris. Jomini retired 
from military service in 1848, though the czar recalled him briefly in 1853 to serve as a 
military advisor during the Crimean War. Following his service to the czar, Jomini 
                                                 
2 John Shy, “Jomini” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter 
Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 143.  
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid.,156. 
5 Gerard Chaliand, The Art of War in World History: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1994), 724. 
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returned to retirement, though he briefly advised Napoleon III in 1859, during the Italian 
War. He died in Paris in 1869.6   
In The Art of War, Jomini proposed one “fundamental principle of war” 
governing all the operations undertaken in war. The fundamental principle contained four 
maxims which, according to Jomini, must be followed by the military commander. These 
maxims are: 
1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, upon the 
decisive points of a theatre of war, and also upon the communications of the 
enemy as much as possible without compromising one’s own. 
2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one’s 
forces. 
3. On the battle-field, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or 
upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to 
overthrow. 
4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive 
point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with energy.7 
On the surface, these maxims appeared simplistic and self-evident. Jomini admitted as 
much. Anticipating this potential criticism, Jomini clarified that the fundamental principle 
“must be followed in all good combinations.”8  By this, Jomini implied that success in 
war depends not only upon a solid understanding of the principles of war, but also upon 
the manner and skill with which the commander applies them. 
 It is worth noting that three of four maxims specifically mention “decisive 
point(s),” suggesting the paramount importance that Jomini placed upon the concept. In 
Article XIX of The Art of War, Jomini’s taxonomy of significant “points” in the area of 
concern suggests how a military commander should evaluate his options on the 
battlefield. Generally, the commander is concerned with strategic lines and points, though 
both vary in nature and importance, depending on the circumstances of the conflict. 
Based on this proposition, Jomini argued that there are three basic types of points that are 
of interest to the commander: geographical strategic points, which derive their 
significance simply by virtue of physical location; strategic points of maneuver, which 
                                                 
6 Chaliand, The Art of War in World History, 724. 
7 Jomini, Art of War, 55. 
8 Ibid. 
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evolve as troops maneuver on the battlefield; and decisive strategic points, which Jomini 
described as those “whose importance is constant and immense.”9  Decisive strategic 
points are “those which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the 
result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise.”10 One can conclude that Jomini was 
primarily concerned with the physical and geographical aspect of points, rather than their 
philosophical or temporal nature. This is not to say that Jomini had no opinion 
concerning the role of politics, psychology, or time in the prosecution of war. However, 
his emphasis on lines of defense, operational fronts, and well-located fortresses as good 
examples of decisive strategic points illustrate the dominant role of geography in 
Jomini’s analysis.11 
  Going one step further, Jomini broke decisive points down into two types: 
decisive geographic points (or lines) and decisive points of maneuver. One could argue 
that Jomini unnecessarily added layers of complexity to his taxonomy of decisive points, 
given that he had already conceptualized geographic strategic points and strategic points 
of maneuver. Therefore, adding the term decisive to each might seem superfluous. In 
order to contrast between the concepts of decisive and non-decisive, Jomini used Lyons 
and Leipzig as examples of points that could be either, depending upon circumstances. 
Jomini characterized Lyons as an “important strategic point,” since it formed the nexus of 
control of the Rhone and Saône valleys, as well as the “center of communication between 
France and Italy.”12  Similar to Lyons, Leipsic was also considered an important strategic 
point, given its position as the bridge of all communications in Northern Germany. 
However, Jomini argued that these two points were not necessarily decisive “unless well 
fortified [sic] or possessing an extended camp with têtes de pont.”13 As for decisive 
points of maneuver, Jomini characterized them similarly as circumstantial, relative to 
troop position on both sides.14  Generally speaking, “the decisive points of maneuver are 
                                                 





14 Ibid. ,69. 
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on the flank of the enemy upon which, if his opponent operates, he can more easily cut 
him off from his base and supporting forces without being exposed to the same 
danger.”15  What can be inferred from Jomini, then, is that a decisive point necessarily 
implies the immediate presence of troops or military fortifications. If this were not the 
case, then Jomini would have contradicted himself with the Lyons and Leipsic examples. 
By his own definition of decisive strategic points, Lyons and Leipsic should have been 
considered as such. Yet Jomini says that they are merely strategic points of importance to 
the commander. Logically, Lyons and Leipsic cannot be both decisive and non-decisive 
at the same time, so there must be some variable which alters the equation, such that a 
previously non-decisive point becomes decisive. Lyons and Leipsic become decisive only 
when troops or fortifications are placed at, or near, those points. Therefore, one could 
infer that Jomini viewed the destruction of the opposing army as the primary objective of 
a campaign, given the enemy force’s “decisive” character. 
 Jomini’s focus on the opposing army becomes much more apparent in his 
description of objective points. Though he did not mention objective points by name in 
the fundamental principle of war, Jomini introduced them immediately after his 
discussion of decisive points in Article XIX. Like decisive points, objective points were 
categorized as either maneuver or geographical. As the name suggests, objective points 
referred to the goal or end state of a military endeavor. However, Jomini’s discussion of 
objective points was limited to strategy, as opposed to other levels of war such as tactics.  
“Strategy,” as defined by Jomini, “is the art of making war upon the map, and 
comprehends the whole theatre of operations. … Strategy decides where to act; logistics 
brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the 
employment of the troops.”16 From a strategic standpoint, therefore, the geographic 
objective point is determined by the object of the campaign. Usually, the objective point 
would be a capital, though it may be a fort or line of defense, depending on 
circumstances.17 Perhaps in a nod to Clausewitz, Jomini advised, “As to the choice of 
                                                 
15 Jomini, Art of War, 69. 
16 Ibid., 54. 
17 Ibid., 70. 
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objective points, every thing [sic] will generally depend upon the aim of the war and the 
character which political or other circumstances may give it, and, finally, upon the 
military facilities of the two parties.”18 
 Interestingly, Jomini did not identify much variance in the choice of objectives 
when it came to objective points of maneuver at the strategy level. In fact, Jomini 
asserted that objective points of maneuver are singularly “those which relate to the 
destruction or decomposition of the hostile forces.”19 Effectively identifying these points 
not only gave the greatest probability of success, but was also a critical skill for a general. 
Jomini added that: 
This was the most conspicuous merit of Napoleon. Rejecting old systems, 
which were satisfied by the capture of one or two points or with the 
occupation of an adjoining province, he was convinced that the best means 
of accomplishing great results was to dislodge and destroy the hostile 
army,-since states and provinces fall of themselves when there is no 
organized force to protect them.20 
Jomini’s bias towards offensive operations is evident in this praise of Napoleon. This is 
not to say that Jomini denied in absolute terms the occasional utility of the defense; 
however, his idea of a defensive objective point is, not surprisingly, that which is to be 
defended against an attacking force. By inference, the objective point is the same for both 
the offense and defense. It is understandable, then, how a disciple of Jomini might come 
to view the offense favorably as the superior form of warfare. All things being equal, 
including the objective point, the offense would theoretically have the advantage because 
it could choose the time and manner of attack, as well as the ability to withdraw. In other 
words, the offense holds the initiative. Whether or not Jomini intended to build a case for 
seizing the initiative is unclear. However, his arguments yielded an unspoken lesson that 
has held widespread and lasting appeal: if one wants to truly accomplish great things in 
war, he must go on the offensive. He must act. He must create the opportunities that will 
                                                 




allow him to achieve greatness. These things will not happen by passively sitting in the 
defense.   
 Ultimately, Jomini acknowledged that the fundamental principle is a guideline, 
not a checklist. “War in its ensemble is not a science, but an art. Strategy, particularly, 
may indeed be regarded by fixed laws resembling those of the positive sciences, but this 
is not true of war viewed as a whole.”21 Nevertheless, Jomini was quick to remind his 
readers that the uncertainties of war did not excuse commanders of their duty to approach 
the business of war scientifically. Nor did uncertainty preclude the existence of sound 
rules that, if followed, increased the likelihood of victory. As Jomini advised, “It is true 
that theories cannot teach men with mathematical precision what they should do in every 
possible case; but it is also certain that they will always point out the errors which should 

















                                                 
21 Jomini, Art of War, 258. 




CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ 
 
 Born in 1780 in Berg, Prussia, Carl von Clausewitz saw his first combat at age 
twelve, during the winter campaign to drive the French army out of the Rhineland.23 
After the army demobilized in 1795, Clausewitz returned to Prussia where he served in 
small garrison assignments for the next six years. After sufficiently progressing in his 
military career, Clausewitz applied and gained admission to the military school in Berlin, 
which he began attending in 1801. During his studies at the academy, Clausewitz was 
heavily influenced by the modern ideas of warfare espoused by the school’s director at 
the time, Colonel Gerhard von Scharnhorst. Clausewitz graduated first in his class in 
1804, and was appointed adjutant to Prince August of Prussia.24 Recognizing 
Clausewitz’s talent and penchant for challenging the stifling traditionalism of the 
Prussian army, Scharnhorst recommended him to the pre-eminent military journal at the 
time for publication. In 1805, Clausewitz published his first article in which he refuted 
the strategic theories of Heinrich Dietrich von Bulow, who was considered to be the 
leading German expert on Napoleonic warfare at the time.25 Hinting at what he would 
later write in On War, Clausewitz argued that any good theory of war had to be valid for 
all places, at all times. Von Bulow’s theory, he argued, did not meet this standard.26  
The following year in 1806, Clausewitz fought against Napoleon’s forces as the 
French army swept across Europe. At the battle of Auerstadt, Clausewitz and Prince 
August were captured and subsequently sent to France, where they would remain under 
light guard until released back to Prussia in late 1807. In 1808, Clausewitz rejoined his 
mentor, Scharnhorst, who was heading reform efforts to transform the Prussian army. 
From his observations of French society, Clausewitz had been similarly convinced, as 
                                                 
23 Peter Paret, “Clausewitz” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 188. 
24 Ibid.,189. 
25 Ibid., 190. 
26 Ibid. 
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was Scharnhorst, of the need to reform the Prussian military, particularly regarding its 
relationship, or lack thereof, to society.27 During the next few years, Clausewitz 
aggressively promoted military reform, both as a member of the general staff, as well as 
an appointee in various specialty assignments, such as lecturer at the newly formed war 
college, tutor to the crown prince, and doctrine developer for infantry and cavalry units.28  
In 1812, however, Napoleon’s army occupied Prussia unopposed and began using it as a 
staging ground to launch an invasion of Russia. Clausewitz resigned in protest and sought 
a commission in the Russian army, where he served as a staff officer and advisor. As 
Napoleon’s forces began their retreat from Moscow in October 1812, Clausewitz 
attempted to rejoin the Prussian army and was eventually readmitted in time for him to 
command its Third Corps during the Hundred Days in 1815.29 In the peace that followed 
the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Clausewitz returned to his study of military history and 
theory, with official duty as chief of staff in the Rhineland. He accepted the position of 
director at the Berlin war college in 1818, and began writing On War the next year. He 
remained at the college until 1830, when the possibility of another European war 
surfaced. Clausewitz was appointed chief of staff of Prussian forces, though he died in 
1831, as a result of a widespread cholera epidemic that was sweeping through Europe.30  
Although Clausewitz never had the chance to complete On War as he had intended, his 
widow, Countess Marie von Brühl, published the unfinished manuscript in 1832. 
In On War, Clausewitz’s main goal was to develop a theory of war. The search 
for such a theory, he argued, was indicative of a natural intellectual endeavor that traced 
its beginnings to the early development of weapons, armor, and fortifications. As 
humanity evolved, so did the tools and conduct of warfare, adding more layers of 
complexity, as siege warfare gave way to mass melee combat, which subsequently gave 
way to formations and ordered battle.31  Eventually, the growing complexities in human 
                                                 
27 Paret, “Clausewitz,” 192. 
28 Ibid., 194. 
29 Ibid., 195.  
30 Ibid., 197. 
31 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 134. 
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affairs necessitated a broad, normative understanding of the nature of war, such that “… 
the principles and rules whereby the controversies that are so normal in military history—
the debate between the conflicting opinions—could be brought to some sort of resolution. 
This maelstrom of opinions, lacking in basic principles and clear laws round which they 
could be crystallized, was bound to be intellectually repugnant.”32 Consequently, some 
tried to derive principles and rules that could be applied to the conduct of war, yet the 
overwhelming complexities involved in war stymied efforts to grasp the whole. Those 
who had constructed models of warfare and soon realized the inherent limitations of 
those models in complex problems adjusted by reducing war to “only factors that could 
be mathematically calculated.”33 Examples of such factors that Clausewitz identified 
were numerical strength, supply and logistics, basing operations, and the geometry of 
interior lines. Yet, Clausewitz was critical of focusing only on the quantifiable factors of 
war, because doing so ignored the moral forces that are inextricably linked to it. As he 
explained: 
It is only analytically that these attempts at theory can be called advances 
in the realm of truth; synthetically, in the rules and regulations they offer, 
they are absolutely useless. They aim at fixed values; but in war 
everything is uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable 
quantities. They direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, 
whereas all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and 
effects. They consider only unilateral action, whereas war consists of a 
continuous interaction of opposites.34 
Consequently, the moral values held by competing sides in a conflict cannot be ignored 
because it is those moral values which provide the emotional spark necessary to drive 
men to violence.  “Military activity,” Clausewitz asserted, “is never directed against 
material force alone; it is always aimed simultaneously at the moral forces which give it 
life, and the two cannot be separated.”35 Of war, Clausewitz thus concluded: 
                                                 
32 Clausewitz, On War, 134. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 136. 
35 Ibid., 137. 
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As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a 
paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, 
which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and 
probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its 
element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it 
subject to reason alone.36 
Respectively, these three aspects manifest themselves in the people and their passions, 
the character and talent of the army and its commanders, and the government. Clausewitz 
insisted that a valid theory of war must maintain a balance between these forces and 
recognize that the relationship between these forces will vary according to the particulars 
of any given situation. Ignoring any of these forces or treating their inter-relationships 
arbitrarily risks creating theories of war that are useless and have no bearing on reality.37  
War, Clausewitz emphasized, is a human endeavor. 
 Taken solely in the abstract sense, war inevitably leads to extremes, Clausewitz 
believed. Without human reason and intellect to moderate it, war naturally progresses 
toward the absolute, following a line of logic reminiscent of Newtonian physics in which 
an object in motion tends to remain in motion until another force acts against it. In theory, 
“the aim of warfare is to disarm the enemy” or to otherwise “put him in a situation that is 
even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make.”38  In order to 
accomplish this, one must apply force, though there is no naturally occurring limit as to 
how much force to use.  “Each side, therefore, compels its opponent to follow suit; a 
reciprocal action is started which must lead, in theory, to extremes.”39  Furthermore, war 
is an interaction between opposing wills, each with theoretically the same aim of 
disarming the other. Clausewitz stressed that resistance is a necessary component of war, 
such that total control in its conduct becomes illusory.  “So long as I have not overthrown 
my opponent I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus, I am not in control: he 
dictates to me as much as I dictate to him.”40 Consequently, one side must match his own 
                                                 
36 Clausewitz, On War, 89. 
37 Ibid. 




efforts against the enemy’s power of resistance, calculated as the inseparable combination 
of means and will, if he is to win. As one adjusts his own efforts to overcome the enemy, 
so will the enemy adjust in return, thereby escalating hostilities to the extreme.41 
 However, the tendency to reach for extremes is characteristic of war only in an 
abstract sense. In a world ungoverned by reason or temperance, the interplay of extremes 
becomes “a clash of forces freely operating and obedient to no law but their own.”42  
Taken to its logical end, this dynamic dictates that an actor in war should always apply 
the maximum force possible. In fact, Clausewitz noted, “If we were to think purely in 
absolute terms, we could avoid every difficulty by a stroke of the pen and proclaim with 
inflexible logic that, since the extreme must always be the goal, the greatest effort must 
always be exerted.”43 Yet abstraction does not mirror reality. If this were the case, war 
could be conceived as a single decisive act, isolated from the considerations of pre-
existing relations between its actors and estimates of its consequences. In reality, wars 
never come about completely unexpectedly, as there is always some political condition 
existing between the parties in war that allows them to evaluate each other’s tendencies 
and motivations. Preparations for war are gradual, and the reality of resource constraints 
sets in as “material calculations take the place of hypothetical extremes.”44  Clausewitz 
thus concluded that warfare “eludes the strict theoretical requirement that extremes of 
force be applied.”45  
How much force or effort to apply in a given situation becomes a matter of 
judgment, subject not only to the laws of probability, but also the political objective of 
the war. As the central moderating element, “the political object—the original motive for 
the war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of 
effort it requires.”46 The political object itself does not, however, have any intrinsic 
value. Rather, it can be measured only within 
                                                 
41 Clausewitz, On War, 77. 
42 Ibid., 78. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 79. 
45 Ibid., 80. 
46 Ibid., 81. 
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the context of the two states at war. The same political object can elicit 
differing reactions from different peoples, and even from the same people 
at different times. …  Thus, it follows that without any inconsistency wars 
can have all degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of 
extermination down to simple armed observation.47 
In other words, no two wars are ever the same. Nor, Clausewitz argued, are victory and 
defeat in war permanent outcomes. Of defeat, Clausewitz termed the condition as merely 
a “transitory evil” that the losing party seeks to overturn at some future time.48  Any 
periods of perceived military inaction are temporary, as both sides wait to gain an 
advantage over the other before acting once again.49  
Theoretically, however, there would never be periods of inactivity in war. Yet, as 
Clausewitz noted, such periods exist. In fact, “history so often shows … that immobility 
and inactivity are the normal state of armies in war, and action is the exception.”50  
Briefly, Clausewitz highlighted three factors that cause periods of inaction. First, there is 
the dominant human tendency towards fear, indecision, and laziness.   The loss of 
momentum caused by these tendencies can only be overcome by strong military 
leadership or overwhelming political pressure. Second, war is too complex to be 
understood in its entirety, and both sides in a conflict deal will consequently deal with 
imperfect information as they try to understand their own situation as well as that of the 
enemy. As a result, one side might miscalculate and fail to exploit an advantageous 
position over his enemy, and instead wait for a more opportune moment. Third, prudence 
and risk aversion often find ways to creep into the minds of military commanders and 
“…tame the elemental fury of war.”51 
Clausewitz judged the effects of these behaviors quite negatively concerning the 
era of warfare prior to Napoleon and Frederick. Earlier conflicts, he reasoned, generally 
amounted to little more than petty squabbles where no vital interests were threatened. 
Somewhat derisively, Clausewitz characterizes pre-Napoleonic warfare as often “tame 
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and half-hearted” and “…a mild attempt to gain some small advantage before sitting back 
and letting matters take their course … to be discharged with as little effort as 
possible.”52  Invoking the image of a fencing duel, Clausewitz portrayed the art of war 
prior to Napoleon as a series of “feints, parries, and short lunges” from which 
contemporary thinkers distilled military theory.53  Similarly, Clausewitz criticized the 
notion of his contemporaries as “petty” that the recent Napoleonic wars represented little 
more than “…crude brawls that can teach nothing and that are to be considered as 
relapses into barbarism.”54 Drawing lessons from the exploits of Napoleon and Frederick 
the Great, Clausewitz warned of the danger in clinging to half-hearted political measures 
in the face of a determined enemy: 
Woe to the government, which … meets a foe who, like the untamed 
elements, knows no law other than his own power!  Any defect of action 
and effort will turn to the advantage of the enemy, and it will not be easy 
to change from a fencer’s position to that of a wrestler. A slight blow may 
then often be enough to cause a total collapse.55   
In spite of all his admonitions and criticisms, Clausewitz did not intend to dismiss wars 
with more limited aims as an anachronistic concept. Rather, his argument was that 
analyzing campaigns such as those of Napoleon and Frederick provided a more 
comprehensive case study from which to extract valuable insights. 
 Although Clausewitz’s drew heavily on the Napoleonic experience during his 
quest for a general theory of war, he absolutely rejected the idea that theory should 
become “a positive doctrine, a sort of manual for action.”56 Instead, Clausewitz treated 
theory as an analytical process of inquiry “leading to a close acquaintance with the 
subject; applied to experience—in our case, to military history—it leads to a thorough 
familiarity with it.”57 Good theory, he said, could foster sound principles and rules, 
subject to the scientific law of reason. Nevertheless, “even these principles and rules are 
                                                 
52 Clausewitz, On War, 218. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 219. 
56 Ibid., 141. 
57 Clausewitz, On War, 141. 
 15 
intended to provide a thinking man with a frame of reference, …rather than to serve as a 
guide which at the moment of action lays down precisely the path he must take.”58  A 
positive doctrine which will always serve as a reliable guide for a commander can never 
be achieved. No matter how encompassing a theoretical model of war may be, that 
commander will inevitably find himself in conflict with it and will have to rely on his 
own unique capacity to discern truth. As Clausewitz put it, “talent and genius operate 
outside the rules, and theory conflicts with practice.”59  Ultimately, valid theory must 
never conflict with reality. 
 In Book Two, Chapter 2, of On War, Clausewitz converges on a singular 
conclusion pertaining to the proper role of theory. Despite the aforementioned difficulties 
with arriving at valid theory, Clausewitz proposed that such a theory was possible if kept 
within certain bounds. In the context of warfare, theory could not be prescriptive if it 
were to retain validity. By his conception of validity, Clausewitz argued that theory must 
be true across time, and in all cases. He thus concludes, “It is the task of theory, then, to 
study the nature of ends and means.”60  In a purely theoretical sense, the main goal or end 
of war is to disarm the enemy, while doing so also represents the means for achieving the 
war’s political purpose (understood in the abstract to mean a return to peace). In reality, 
however, it is not a necessary condition that any one side in a conflict must achieve total 
disarmament of his enemy before pursuing peace. As Clausewitz observed, wars had 
been fought in the past between opponents of unequal strength. Theoretically, the 
stronger side should have fought the war until his enemy was completely disarmed, yet 
this did not necessarily happen. To explain this phenomenon, Clausewitz identified two 
deterrents that induce a moderating effect on the natural tendency of war toward the 
extreme: one is the “improbability of victory,” and the second is the “unacceptable cost” 
of prosecuting a war beyond a certain threshold.61  The degree to which these factors 
influence either side in war will vary from situation to situation: 
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Once the extreme is no longer feared or aimed at, it becomes a matter of 
judgment what degree of effort should be made; and this can only be 
based on the phenomena of the real world and the laws of probability. 
Once … war is no longer a theoretical affair but a series of actions 
obeying its own peculiar laws, reality supplies the data from which we can 
deduce the unknown that lies ahead.62 
By his own standards at least, Clausewitz’s theory of war passed the validity test.   
 For all of Clausewitz’s skepticism regarding principles and rules, he did however 
advance one idea that could serve future commanders as a useful guide for action; 
namely, the principle of polarity. While not necessarily a principle of war in the tactical 
sense, polarity was Clausewitz’s way of thinking about the underlying logic of conflict, 
absent the moral or emotional component. Using a hypothetical example as a starting 
point for his analysis, Clausewitz imagined two battling commanders whose interests “are 
opposed in equal measure to each other” as a way of conceptualizing pure polarity.63 In 
this scenario, the two commanders completely cancel each other out, because achieving 
victory cannot apply to both at the same time; one commander’s victory necessarily 
excludes the other from accomplishing the same. Clausewitz emphasized, however, that 
the principle of polarity applies in this example only with regard to the interests of the 
two commanders, and not the commanders themselves. As Clausewitz explained: 
The principle of polarity is valid only in relation to one and the same 
object, in which positive and negative interests exactly cancel one another 
out. … When, however, we are dealing with two different things that have 
a common relationship external to themselves, the polarity lies not in the 
things but in their relationship.64 
In other words, the polarity principle concerns objectives, not actors. 
 With the goal of linking the polarity principle to the formulation of military 
strategy, Clausewitz began with the proposition that there are only two distinct forms of 
action war: offensive and defensive.65  The defense, he argued, was the stronger form of 
warfare because of the very nature of polarity. Clausewitz reasoned that polarity “does 
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not lie in attack or defense, but in the object both seek to achieve: the decision. If one 
commander wants to postpone the decision, the other must want to hasten it, always 
assuming that both are engaged in the same kind of fighting.”66 Ultimately, the question 
both commanders would have to ask themselves is whether postponing the decision is 
more advantageous for one side than the defense is for the other. If the attacker must 
postpone the decision because he cannot, or thinks he cannot, overcome the defender’s 
advantage, then the drive towards offensive action fizzles, along with the war’s 
progression.67  Conversely, if the defender is too weak to assume an offensive posture, it 
will have to accept unfavorable fighting conditions for the foreseeable future; however, 
this prospect may still be preferable to attacking immediately or suing for peace.68 
Clausewitz was convinced that this rationale caused the periods of military inaction that 
were so prevalent in the historical record. Furthermore, he concluded that the superiority 
of the defense negates the effects of polarity. The implication polarity has for military 
strategy, then, is two-fold. First, if polarity lies in relationships and not things, then the 
commander must carefully identify and understand the objective over which he is 
fighting. Second, once the commander understands the objective and its relation to both 
sides, he must apportion his forces commensurate with the value of the objective.  “The 
weaker the motives for action,” Clausewitz warned, “the more they will be overlaid and 
neutralized by the disparity between attack and defense, and the more frequently will 
action be suspended—as indeed experience shows.”69 
 The final piece to Clausewitz’s polarity principle lies in the nature of the decision 
which opposing forces seek.  “War,” said Clausewitz, “is a clash between major interests, 
which is resolved by bloodshed—that is the only way in which it differs from other 
conflicts.”70 Therefore, “the destruction of enemy forces must be regarded as the main 
objective; not just in war generally, but in each individual engagement and within all the 
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different conditions necessitated by the circumstances out of which war has arisen.”71 
Destruction, by Clausewitz’s definition, meant tactical successes on the battlefield. Only 
tactical success leads to strategic success, so tactical success is of utmost importance in 
war.72  Hence, the decision which opposing commanders seek is victory. This conclusion 
is self-evident and tautological, but it is important to note that Clausewitz did not specify 
how much of the enemy one must destroy in order to achieve victory, only that at least 
some must be destroyed. Indeed, whether one achieves victory depends on the metrics 
both sides are using and the objective. The central idea Clausewitz tried to advance was 
that war necessitated some measure of violence, the application of which should always 
be the “dominant consideration.”73 This means that destroying the enemy, or some 
portion of it, is a necessary, though not always sufficient, condition for achieving victory. 
The value of the polarity principle lies not in its power to tell a commander how to 
conduct his battles. Rather, it assists the commander in identifying the right objectives 
over which he will fight and possibly to what degree he may have to commit resources. 
 As a principle, Clausewitz’s concept of polarity tells the commander, not what to 
do, but how to think. Indeed, the principle of polarity reflects Clausewitz’s approach to 
theory, which used opposing extremes in the abstract in order to emphasize ideas. 
Acknowledging that reality is not characterized by extremes, Clausewitz said that “war 
generally falls somewhere in between, and is influenced by these extremes only to the 
extent to which it approaches them.”74 As to what a commander should do once he thinks 
he has arrived at the truth of a situation, Clausewitz advised: 
All means … have only a relative value; all are inhibited by certain 
limitations on both sides. Beyond this sphere, a different set of rules 
applies, in a totally different universe of phenomena. A general … must 
never expect to move on the narrow ground of illusory security as if it 
were absolute; he must never permit himself to feel that the means he is 
using are absolutely necessary and the only ones possible, and persist in 
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using them even though he may shudder at the thought of their possible 
inadequacy.75 
While accepting the existence of truth, Clausewitz did not believe that there was any 
system or fixed procedure for recognizing it. Only seasoned judgment and experience 
could enable one to see the truth.76 Furthermore, even if one could arrive at some 
ontological truth, such an accomplishment would still be no guarantee of victory, since 
chance and probability are always a factor. 
 In conclusion, it is important to highlight Clausewitz’s emphasis on the role of 
theory and his skepticism towards the utility of principles and rules in war. As stated 
previously, Clausewitz’s goal in On War was to formulate a theory of war that had 
universal applicability. Theory, he concluded, studies the nature of means and ends. It 
does not, however, prescribe how to employ means to achieve ends. Because of the 
interplay of chance and probability in all war, Clausewitz hesitated to advance any 
principles or rules that seemed to guarantee victory if followed. To the extent which 
Clausewitz offered anything prescriptive, one could argue that the polarity principle best 
fits this categorization. Though the principle was derived from Clausewitz’s theory of 
ends and means, it provides the commander with a practical tool with which to 
understand his objectives, either at the tactical or strategic level of analysis. This is not to 
say that Clausewitz had no advice to offer commanders regarding various tactical tasks. 
Indeed, he had much to say on conducting attacks, building defenses, moving formations 
through various terrain, and maneuver in battle. However, Clausewitz would have 
cautioned that even his own advice should not become fixed law or principle, for it is 
either too tempting or too easy to interpret military history out of its proper context. 
Never, wrote Clausewitz, should ..”. a critic…rank the various styles and methods that 
emerge as if they were stages of excellence, subordinating one to the other. They exist 
side by side, and their use must be judged on its merits in each individual case.”77 
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Analysis  
 One of the great challenges in assessing the debate between Clausewitz and 
Jomini over rules and principles is that each viewed the role of theory differently. For 
Clausewitz, the ultimate purpose of theory was to educate the commander, whereas for 
Jomini, the end of theory was to derive a set of principles that would guide the actions of 
the commander on the battlefield. Yet, Clausewitz was not silent regarding actions on the 
battlefield, as any comprehensive text such as On War would presumably address tactics 
and strategy in a practical manner. Although On War was never completed, what 
survived of Clausewitz’s manuscript addressed many of the same concepts that Jomini 
had in Art of War, such as superiority of numbers, surprise, theatre geometry, lines of 
operation, and, particularly, decisive points and concentration of forces.78 The scope of 
this thesis does not allow addressing all these considerations in detail. What it has tried to 
do, however, is identify from the treatises of Clausewitz and Jomini their respective 
central principles concerning the art and science of war.   
 Jomini’s fundamental principle emphasized the importance of decisive points in 
war. According to the principle, the commander is obliged to mass his combat power on 
the decisive point at such a time and to such a degree as to assure victory. While doing 
so, the commander must not expose his own forces to counterattack. In order to lessen the 
danger to his own forces, the commander should strive to employ the bulk of his own 
forces against fractions of the enemy’s whenever possible.   
 It is unlikely that Clausewitz would have disputed the logic of Jomini’s 
fundamental principle. In fact, Clausewitz incorporated much of Jomini’s principle into 
his own discussion concerning the importance of numerical strength. If a numerically 
inferior force goes into battle against a numerically superior force, Clausewitz argued, the 
weaker side can still achieve victory by employing its forces “…with such skill that even 
in the absence of absolute superiority, relative superiority is attained at the decisive 
point.”79 Hence, both Clausewitz and Jomini understood decisive points as something to 
which a commander should focus the bulk of his attention and resources. 
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 Similarly, it is unlikely that Jomini would have disputed the logic of Clausewitz’s 
polarity principle. In his discussion on objective points, Jomini said that choosing the 
right ones depends on the aims of the war, the war’s character, political circumstances, 
and the disposition of the opposing armies. Like Clausewitz, Jomini understood that 
objective and decisive points were considered as such only within the relational context 
of the opposing armies to something external from them. As Clausewitz said, polarity lies 
not in the actors, but in their relationships. Thus, one might conclude that Clausewitz’s 
polarity principle complements and provides the underlying logic for the Jominian 
decisive and objective point. 
 Overall, the debate between Jomini and Clausewitz does not indicate that they 
held diametrically opposed viewpoints on the nature and conduct of war. Jomini’s 
fundamental principle and Clausewitz’s polarity principle were not mutually exclusive 
concepts. While Clausewitz and Jomini disagreed on some aspects of warfare, such as the 
significance of interior lines, such disputes are to be expected in the course of interpreting 
military history. The distinction between the two men is that each wrote for different 
purposes. As one viewpoint put it, “Clausewitz’s clear intention in On War was 
philosophic speculation. … Jomini’s Precis is a manual; it is intended to be taken to the 
field.”80  Essentially, the debate between Clausewitz and Jomini was over the role of 
theory. 
 In his conclusion to Art of War, Jomini asserted that, “Correct theories, founded 
upon right principles, sustained by actual events of wars, and added to accurate military 
history, will form a true school of instruction for generals.”81 Clausewitz was clearly 
uncomfortable with the notion of “right” principles, particularly because such claims to 
correctness ignored the uncertainty inherent in war. Jomini, on the other hand, 
acknowledged and accepted many Clausewitzian concepts, such as chance, military 
genius, passion, and morale. In fact, Jomini explicitly wrote that war as a whole could not 
“be regulated by fixed laws resembling those of the positive sciences.”82Yet, he rejected 
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Clausewitz’s implicit conclusion that no practical theory of war could be formulated 
because the outcomes could not be guaranteed. In a rhetorical challenge Jomini asked, 
“Shall a theory be pronounced absurd because it has only three-fourths of the whole 
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II. MAHAN VS. MACKINDER 
Issue: Which is more consequential for national objectives– land power or 
sea power? 
The debate between Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Halford J. Mackinder 
concerned the relative importance of sea power versus land power to national objectives. 
While neither argued that land or sea power was inconsequential, their interpretation of 
history differed, leading them to arrive at different conclusions. Widely recognized as the 
modern champion of sea power, Mahan postulated that navies were critical to the 
prosperity and security of nations. Mackinder, on the other hand, took a more nuanced 
view. Though he acknowledged the importance of sea power, Mackinder argued that 
geography and technological trends suggest a greater relevance for land power. This 
chapter will examine the various arguments of Mahan and Mackinder as advanced in 
their major publications. For Mahan, this chapter will focus chiefly on The Influence of 
Sea Power upon History (1660–1783), published in 1890, as well as Naval Strategy 
Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on 
Land, published in 1911. For Mackinder, this chapter will draw primarily from “The 
Geographical Pivot of History,” published as an article in 1904, as well as Democratic 
Ideals and Reality, published in 1919. The intent of this chapter is not to declare a winner 
of the debate, or to say that one was right while the other was wrong, but to evaluate each 











ALFRED THAYER MAHAN 
Born in West Point, New York on September 27, 1840, Alfred Thayer Mahan was 
the eldest son of then dean of faculty at the United States Military Academy. In 1852, the 
young Mahan was sent to boarding school, where he studied for two years before 
enrolling in Columbia College in New York City.84 Following two years at Columbia, 
Mahan entered the U.S. Naval Academy, from which he graduated in 1859. During the 
American Civil War, Mahan conducted naval patrols along the Confederate coasts, but 
saw relatively little action. After the war, Mahan returned to the Naval Academy and 
briefly served as an instructor in seamanship before embarking on a series of assignments 
in navy yards and at sea over the next two decades.85 In 1884, at the invitation of 
Commodore Stephen Luce, Mahan accepted a faculty position at the newly established 
Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. After several delays, Mahan eventually 
reported for duty at the college in 1886. Upon arriving, however, he discovered that Luce 
had been deployed at sea, and that Mahan would immediately assume duties as the school 
president, as well as lecturer in naval history and strategy.86 Between 1886 and 1893, 
Mahan published his two most well-known works, The Influence of Sea Power upon 
History (1660–1783) and The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and 
Empire (1793–1812). He left the Naval War College briefly to take command of the 
steam-powered cruiser USS Chicago, but returned in 1895 to resume lecturing. After 
retiring from active service in 1896, Mahan spent most of his time writing for various 
publications and journals, eventually resulting in honorary degrees from several 
prestigious universities. Well-regarded as a naval historian and advisor, Mahan was 
occasionally asked to serve on various governmental delegations and policy boards, 
including the Naval War Board in 1898, The Hague Peace Conference in 1899, and the 
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committee to reorganize the Navy Department  under President Theodore Roosevelt.87  
In December of 1914, Mahan died of heart failure at the age of seventy-four. 
Perhaps the most elucidating aspect of Mahan’s theory of naval strategy was the 
distinction he drew between military strategy and naval strategy. Strategy, Mahan noted, 
was generally synonymous with military strategy, such that use of either term limited 
analysis to “military combinations embracing one or more fields of operations, either 
wholly or mutually dependent, but always regarded as actual or immediate scenes of 
war.”88 Mahan believed that strategy differed from military strategy in that the former 
possessed both peacetime and wartime considerations, whereas the latter was only 
necessary for war. To underscore this point, Mahan argued that a peacetime land force 
“may gain its most decisive victories by occupying in a country, either by purchase or 
treaty, excellent positions which would perhaps hardly be got by war.”89 Mahan 
subsequently asserted that naval strategy mirrored strategy in general. In other words, 
naval strategy concerned peacetime operations, as well as the conduct of war. Thus, 
Mahan concluded, “Naval strategy has indeed for its end to found, support, and increase, 
as well as in peace as in war, the sea power of a country.”90  
 The term “sea power” was coined by Mahan and was, in his assessment, the 
critical ingredient to national prosperity.91 However, Mahan’s definition of sea power 
was two-fold. In one instance, he describes sea power by recounting the example of how 
Louis XIV systematically built up France’s maritime infrastructure during the 1660s by 
controlling domestic manufacturing, increasing the size of the navy, consolidating 
government power, and securing new markets for goods. The aggregate of “all these 
means, embracing countless details, were employed to build up for  
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France (1) Production; (2) Shipping; (3) Colonies and Markets, - in a word, sea power.”92 
In another instance, Mahan describes sea power in more militaristic language: 
It is not the taking of individual ships or convoys, be they few or many, 
that strikes down the money power of a nation; it is the possession of that 
overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from it, or 
allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and which, by controlling the great 
common, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the 
enemy’s shores. … This overbearing power can only be exercised by great 
navies.93 
Though Mahan defined sea power ambiguously, this was likely intentional. As his 
definition of naval strategy encompassed both war and peacetime considerations, so did 
the application of sea power. Therefore, depending on the state of affairs of the nation in 
question, one definition might prove more useful than the other.   
 Nevertheless, it is likely that Mahan intended for both definitions of sea power to 
complement each other. In 1911, Mahan wrote that, “Commercial value cannot be 
separated from military in sea strategy, for the great interest of the sea is commerce.”94  
Almost twenty years earlier, Mahan noted that “the history of sea power, while 
embracing in its broad sweep all that tends to make a people great upon the sea or by the 
sea, is largely a military history.”95 Thus, Mahan saw commercial and military interests 
as inextricably linked. As he put it, the raison d’être of the navy is the protection 
shipping interests.96 Consequently, he warned, the importance of the navy’s role should 
not be underestimated. Using the example of a country’s key trade routes, Mahan argued 
that such passages could not fall outside military purview or interest. Without a powerful 
navy “it may be beyond the ability of the country interested effectively to control it, and 
in such a case, in war, commercial convenience must yield to the conditions imposed by 
the limitations of the nation’s military strength.”97 
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   As to the extent of sea power’s importance to national objectives, Mahan had the 
following to say: 
The interests of a nation in the sea are almost wholly interests of trade—of 
carriage. The productions of the sea, though valuable, are trifling in 
amount as compared with those on land. Its great value to mankind is that 
it furnishes the most copious means of communications and traffic 
between peoples; often the only means.98 
In Mahan’s view, trade and commerce were fixed national interests. Though a nation’s 
production capacity and wealth are tied to the land, opening new markets, establishing 
trade agreements, and maintaining diplomatic relations with other nations are tied to the 
sea. Also, in order to secure those national interests to the extent that they rely on control 
of the sea, a navy is necessary.   
 However, in order to understand Mahan’s conception of national interest, it is 
important to first examine his theoretical approach to war and its connection to the goals 
of a nation. Mahan’s inspiration, as evidenced by his frequent references, was Baron de 
Jomini. In his writings and lectures, Mahan incorporated many of the same ideas and 
principles that Jomini had developed, such as theatres of war, zones of operation, 
concentration of forces, unity of command, geometry, lines of communication, and 
decisive points. Another indicator of Jomini’s influence was Mahan’s conviction that war 
was governed by immutable principles: 
War … has principles; their existence is detected by the study of the past, 
which reveals them in successes and in failures, the same form age to age. 
Conditions and weapons change; but … respect must be had to these 
constant teachings of history in the tactics of the battlefield, or in those 
wider operations of war which are comprised under the name of 
strategy.99 
Also, like Jomini, Mahan separated his discussion of war into tactical and strategic 
realms. Strategy, as defined by Jomini and Mahan, concerns when and where to deploy 
forces for the purpose of military confrontation. Tactics, on the other hand, is concerned 
with how best to employ forces during a battle.   
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Within the context of military operations and the principles that guide their proper 
execution, Mahan and Jomini were very much in agreement, particularly concerning the 
principle of concentration.   However, Mahan’s concept of sea power drove him toward a 
more expansive view of strategy, as compared to Jomini. In Jomini’s view, the statesman 
and general might jointly decide on the nature or character of the war to be fought, but 
formulation of strategy and its execution was a matter best left to the general.100  
Whereas Jomini treated the statesman and the general as unrelated fields, Mahan viewed 
them as necessarily linked together, with strategy being a shared function between them. 
Using the recent 1909 decision to divide the U.S. Navy’s fleet between the Atlantic and 
Pacific coasts to both reinforce his point, yet show his opposition to the plan, Mahan 
asserted that, “No more convincing instance exists, to my knowledge, of the need of 
statesmen and people to know something about the A, B, C of Naval Strategy; for this 
principle of concentration is the A, B, C.”101  Additionally, Mahan encouraged naval 
officers to immerse themselves in current events and international relations. Addressing 
future naval officers, Mahan advised: 
avoid dissipating your energies upon questions interior to the country; 
questions financial, sociological, economical, or what not. The sphere of 
the navy is international solely. It is this which allies it so closely to that of 
the statesman. Aim yourselves to be statesmen as well as seamen.102 
The navy, in Mahan’s view, is not just a tool of war, but is also a direct extension of a 
nation’s foreign policy.   
 Unlike land power, sea power plays a direct role toward achieving national 
objectives during times of peace. During his discussion on the difference between 
military strategy and naval strategy, Mahan characterized the value of sea power in 
peacetime as:  
…due to the unsettled or politically weak conditions of the regions to 
which navies give access, which armies can only reach by means of 
navies, and in which the operations of an army, if attempted,  depend upon 
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the control of the sea. If a nation wishes to exert political influence in such 
unsettled regions it must possess bases suitably situated; and the needs of 
commerce in peace times often dictate the necessity of such possessions, 
which are acquired … when opportunity offers.103 
As to the role of land power, Mahan observed that the disposition of “great armies now 
prevent such acquisitions, except at the cost of war.”  104 Thus, the true value that sea 
power holds over land power is that sea power allows for the expansion of a nation’s 
territory and holdings without incurring the costs of war.105 
 The notion that sea power might be more relevant than land power because of a 
peacetime consideration might seem ironic, given that Mahan drew mostly from military 
combat history to build his theory of sea power. Indeed, Mahan often attributed sea 
power as the decisive element in determining victory, particularly during the campaigns 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in which the British eventually overcame the 
French.106  Yet, a major criticism of Mahan is that the methodology by which he drew his 
conclusions constituted a reductive fallacy, through which he reduced complexity to 
simplicity by focusing only on facts from historical case studies that supported his own 
preconceived notions. Through this methodology, Mahan’s naval case studies predictably 
concluded that sea power was both a necessary and sufficient cause of the outcome.107  
His steadfast belief in sea power may be best exemplified in his assessment of the rise of 
Great Britain’s naval might.  “It was not by attempting great military operations on land, 
but by controlling the sea, and through the sea the world outside Europe, that [England] 
ensured the triumph of their country.”108 
 As the evangelist of sea power and its influence upon history, Mahan appeared to 
simultaneously diminish the overall importance of land power. Yet, if sea power, but not 
land power, was the critical factor in the greatness of a nation, then Mahan’s theory failed 
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to explain the rise in non-maritime empires, such as Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and 
Germany under Bismarck.109 However, it was not Mahan’s intent to dismiss the 
relevance of land power. Indeed, most principles from his naval strategy were derived 
from Jomini’s land strategy. Rather, Mahan’s aim was to develop naval doctrine for 
nations that desired to become, or maintain their status as, maritime powers.   
At the time Mahan published his two major Influence works on sea power in 1890 
and 1892, the United States was not a formidable maritime power. As a naval officer, he 
clearly desired that it become one. Recognizing that U.S. economic and commercial 
activity was focused on the interior of the country at the time, Mahan understood that 
maritime commerce and trade was not currently part of the national strategy.110  
However, Mahan foresaw that the U.S. would eventually require a commercial shipping 
fleet and, therefore, a bigger navy. History has shown that Mahan’s forecast was 
accurate, though it is likely that Mahan’s exhortations might have had some influence on 
expanding the size of the U.S. Navy. 
Mahan did not categorically dismiss land power as less important than sea power. 
That said, based on the limited number of case studies and his selective collection of 
various facts from among them, one could reasonably claim that Mahan was guilty of 
confirmation bias regarding his promotion of sea power. Essentially, Mahan began with a 
theory of sea power and used only those facts from history that would back it up. Despite 
a flawed scientific approach, this does not necessarily render Mahan’s theory of sea 
power as meaningless or invalid. In fact, sea power may be every bit as critical in a 
particular situation as Mahan suggested. Commerce, trade, and the military forces 
required to safeguard those interests have been, and always will be, in the national 
interests. Whether or not a country is partly, or mostly, a maritime power varies. 
Regardless of the extent to which a nation has maritime interests, however, Mahan’s 
lesson is that sea power is a critical component that must not be ignored. 
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SIR HALFORD JOHN MACKINDER 
 Generally recognized as the founder of geopolitics, Halford J. Mackinder did not 
come from a military background. Born in Lincolnshire, England in 1861, Mackinder 
attended Oxford University from 1880 to 1884. While at Oxford, he studied natural 
sciences and history, earning degrees in both. Before graduating, Mackinder was awarded 
a research scholarship in geology. In 1885, Mackinder studied law in London, and was 
admitted to the bar the following year. In 1887, Mackinder delivered his first paper to the 
Royal Geographic Society (RGS) and was appointed later that year as Reader in 
Geography at Oxford. With assistance from the RGS, Mackinder founded the Oxford 
School of Geography in 1899, the same year that he led the first expedition to the summit 
of Mount Kenya.111  After a serving as an educator and administrator at Oxford 
University, the University of Reading, and the London School of Economics, Mackinder 
switched to a career in politics in 1908. From 1910 to 1922, he served as a member of the 
British Parliament and briefly as High Commissioner to South Russia from 1919 to 1920. 
Retiring from politics in 1923, Mackinder accepted a professorship at the London School 
of Economics. He died in 1947.112 
 Of all Mackinder’s professional publications, two potentially stand out as his most 
influential. The first is “The Geographical Pivot of History,” presented in 1904 to the 
RGS and concurrently published as an article in The Geographic Journal. The second is 
Democratic Ideals and Reality, published in 1919. In the former, Mackinder introduced 
the concept of the Pivot Area, which referred to the core interior of the Eurasian region, 
and suggested that controlling the Pivot Area would enable its owner to dominate the 
world. Following the experience of World War I, Mackinder expanded the Pivot Area 
concept and renamed it as the “Heartland,” which he detailed at length in Democratic 
Ideals and Reality.113 Mackinder’s Pivot Area and Heartland Theory raised many 
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eyebrows at the time, presumably because these ideas suggested that land power had a 
greater influence over history than sea power. These accusations were, however, only 
half-correct. 
 Mackinder heuristically divided the previous two millennia into three broad 
epochs. The first epoch, which he did not officially name, essentially spans ancient Rome 
to the time of Christopher Columbus. The second epoch is the “Columbian epoch,” and 
covers the roughly 400 year period following Columbus’ voyage to the New World. The 
third epoch is the “post-Columbian epoch,” which marked its beginning around the year 
1900.114  Justifying the beginning of the twentieth century as the transition between 
epochs, Mackinder explained that the previous 400 year period, marked by exploration 
and discovery, had effectively run its course, and that the world map was nearly 
completed. With most of the world officially claimed by some major power by 1900, any 
move to acquire or annex territory in the post-Columbian epoch would almost certainly 
result in major war.115   
The key similarity between the Columbian and post-Columbian epochs was the 
shared characteristic of what Mackinder called a “closed political system.”116 In such a 
system, social forces have far-reaching ripple effects. In contrast, the pre-Columbian era 
was not a closed political system because the barbarians acted as a social and physical 
buffer against medieval Christendom. Within the context of the post-Columbian period, 
Mackinder described the effects of a closed system: 
Every explosion of social force, instead of being dissipated in a 
surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, will be sharply 
re-echoed from the far side of the globe, and weak elements in the political 
and economic organism of the world will be shattered in consequence. … 
Probably some half-consciousness of this fact is at last diverting much of 
the attention of statesmen in all parts of the world from territorial 
expansion to the struggle for relative efficiency.117 
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Within the context of the Columbian epoch, the effects of a closed political system shared 
the same dynamic, but on a much smaller scale.118 
As an open system, the pre-Columbian epoch was marked by the formative years 
of European civilization. Broadly speaking, this was a period in which the people that 
lived in what is now called Europe were under constant threat foreign invaders. “I ask 
you … to look upon Europe and European history as subordinate to Asia and Asiatic 
history, for European civilization is, in a very real sense, the outcome of the secular 
struggle against Asiatic invasion.”119  This particular struggle, it turned out, was a contest 
of land power.   
Beginning in the fifth century A.D., the Huns under Attila occupied the Danubian 
outlier of the Eurasian steppes in what is now the southern lowlands of Hungary. From 
there, the Huns launched a series of raids to the north, west, and south against the 
Europeans. Mackinder argued that the coalescing of a European identity began with these 
attacks: 
The Angles and the Saxons, it is quite possible, were then driven across 
the seas to found England and Britain. The Franks, the Goths, and the 
Roman provincials were compelled, for the first time, to stand shoulder to 
shoulder on the battlefield of Chalons, making common cause against the 
Asiatics, who were unconsciously welding together modern France. 
Venice was founded from the destruction of Aquileia and Padua; and even 
the Papacy owed a decisive prestige to the successful mediation of Pope 
Leo with Attila at Milan.120 
On the heels of Attila began a thousand year period of constant invasion from Asian 
horse-riding peoples who freely flowed west through the plains of Russia (now 
Kazakhstan and western Siberia), between the southern tip of the Ural Mountains and the 
northern edge of the Caspian Sea.121 Because they were essentially a nomadic people that 
thrived on the plains, the hordes could not sustainably project their power beyond the 
steppes into the surrounding mountains and forests. Consequently, the hordes could not 
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decisively conquer Europe, though the successive invasions inevitably shaped and 
defined the history of those who opposed them. 122  
 As for the role of the sea-faring Scandinavians who threatened Europe, Mackinder 
argued that they had a similarly formative, yet non-decisive, effect during the pre-
Columbian epoch. Like the nomadic hordes from Asia, the Scandinavians had limited 
ability to project beyond their power base, which, in this case, was water. Nevertheless, 
the Scandinavians were a formidable threat to Europe, second only to the Asian nomads 
in terms of influence.  “Thus, the settled peoples of Europe lay gripped between two 
pressures—that of the Asiatic nomads from the east, and on the other three sides that of 
the pirates from the sea. From its very nature neither pressure was overwhelming, and 
both therefore were stimulative.”123 
 From a geographical perspective, that the state of affairs in Europe remained 
static for almost a thousand years should not have been surprising. Mackinder argued that 
the inner core of the combined continental land mass of Europe and Asia could have 
sustained the nomads almost indefinitely. This inner core, which he referred to as the 
Pivot Area, contained six of the world’s largest rivers. Though the steppes of the inner 
core contained several deserts, the rivers provided enough water to sustain numerous 
pastures and a few oases nonetheless. These conditions allowed “for the maintenance of a 
sparse, but in the aggregate considerable, population of horse-riding and camel-riding 
nomads.”124  
Ironically, Mackinder suggests that sea power was the catalyst that sparked the 
transition from the pre-Columbian to the Columbian epoch. After the fall of the 
Byzantine Empire to the Ottomans in 1453, the Europeans’ spice trade with the Indies 
was hampered. Prior to the Ottomans, Europe’s trading link with the East was over land 
along the Silk Road, though it required one major water crossing at the Bosphorous in 
Constantinople. Not wanting to become too dependent on the Ottomans for trade with the 
Indies, European powers, beginning with the Portuguese, began looking for alternate sea 
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routes to the Indies by sailing east around the southern tip of Africa. Eventually, Vasco 
de Gama succeeded in opening a direct trade link between Europe and India in the late 
fifteenth century, ushering in the Age of Discovery. Aside from the economic benefits, 
however, the opening of a direct route to the India “neutralize[d] the strategic advantage 
of the central position of the steppe-nomads by pressing upon them in rear.”125  
Ultimately, sea power provided the means for Europe to break out from its relatively 
fixed existence.  
The Columbian period thus defined, and was defined by, sea power. As 
Mackinder noted: 
The revolution commenced by the great mariners of the Columbian 
generation endowed Christendom with the widest possible mobility of 
power, short of a winged mobility. The one and continuous ocean 
enveloping the divided and insular lands is, of course, the geographical 
condition of ultimate unity in the command of the sea, and of the whole 
theory of modern naval strategy and policy as expounded by such writers 
as Captain Mahan and Mr. Spencer Wilkinson.126 
The effects of European sea power were so great that it reversed the political and military 
relationship of Europe and Asia. Europe “now emerged upon the world, multiplying 
thirty-fold the sea surface and coastal lands to which she had access, and wrapping her 
influence round the Euro-Asiatic land-power which had hitherto threatened her very 
existence.”127  Essentially, Mackinder admitted, the expansion of European power over 
the 400 years of the Columbian epoch could not have taken place without sea power. 
 At the turn of the twentieth century, however, Mackinder cautioned that the 
importance of sea power might well be overcome by the combined effects of the railroad 
and the expansion of the Russian Empire. Noting that railroads were replacing the horse 
and camel mobility of the Eurasian heartland, Mackinder raised the possibility that land 
power might once again shift the balance of power. The fact that the Russian Army had a 
presence in Manchuria was “as significant evidence of mobile land-power as the British 
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army in South Africa was of sea-power.”128  Though the Trans-Siberian line was the only 
line that spanned the length of Russia in 1904, Mackinder predicted that Asia would be 
covered by a network of railways by the end of the twentieth century. The significance of 
these developments, he argued, is that the sheer size of Russia and Mongolia and their 
combined resources represented powerful economic potential; yet, this potential 
economic engine was inaccessible to the oceans.   
Mackinder proposed that this area of great economic and military potential 
represented the “pivot region of the world’s politics” by which a strategic shift in the 
balance of power might soon occur. Generally speaking, Mackinder envisioned Russia 
consolidating its power by first replacing the Mongol Empire, and then absorbing what he 
termed the “Marginal” or “Inner Crescent” lands of Euro-Asia.129 After that, the pivot 
state could use its new-found resource base to build a massive fleet with which to 
conquer the world. In this particular scenario, Germany would ally itself with Russia, 
thereby causing any number of possible strategic alliances world-wide. However, 
Mackinder conceded that the particular combinations of power or alliances were 
speculative and not material to his main point, which was that “from a geographical point 
of view they are likely to rotate round the pivot state, which is always likely to be great, 
but with limited mobility as compared with the surrounding marginal and insular 
power.”130  
In the aftermath of World War I, in 1919, Mackinder published Democratic Ideals 
and Reality, in which he updated some of his thoughts and ideas from “Geographical 
Pivot of History” in order to reflect current political trends. On the issue of sea-power and 
land-power, Mackinder did address each topic in more detail than he had in 1904, though 
his conclusions regarding the over-emphasis of sea power to the exclusion of land power 
remained much the same. Attributing the current infatuation with sea-power to the British 
victory at Trafalgar, Mahan observed that, “So impressive have been the results of British 
sea-power that there has perhaps been a tendency to neglect the warnings of history and 
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to regard sea-power in general as inevitably having, because of the unity of the ocean, the 
last word in the rivalry with land-power.”131  The key lesson of history, Mahan argued, 
was simply that land power could neutralize sea power by cutting off fleets from their 
bases.132  Put another way, sea power could not exist independently of land power, for 
sea power relies on the resources of the interior. 
The Heartland still retained the industrial and economic potential that Mackinder 
had discussed fifteen years earlier, though he expanded the concept somewhat. Taking 
into account recent political developments and advances in new technology, particularly 
the airplane, Mackinder created the concept of the World-Island, which incorporated 
Europe, Asia, and Africa.133  Yet, Mackinder’s idea of the Heartland as the pivot from 
which power emanated around the world did not radically change in 1919. Somewhat 
prophetically, Mackinder warned: 
Not until about a hundred years ago … was there available a base of man-
power sufficient to begin to threaten the liberty of the world from within 
this citadel of the World-Island. No mere scraps of paper, even though 
they be the written constitution of a League of Nations, are, under the 
conditions of today, a sufficient guarantee that the Heartland will not again 
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Analysis 
 While Mahan and Mackinder favored sea power and land power, respectively, 
neither denied the importance of the other. Mahan respected the value of land power and 
even applied many of Jomini’s principles of war directly to his own theory of naval 
strategy. Likewise, Mackinder respected sea power and credited it with bringing Europe 
out of the Middle Ages. The main difference between the two arguments is that 
Mackinder took the long view, whereas Mahan focused on a comparatively thin slice of 
history. 
 Mahan’s theory of sea power was mostly inspired by the accomplishments of the 
British Navy, particularly the victory of Admiral Lord Nelson at the Battle of Trafalgar in 
1805.   The defeat of the combined French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar assured the 
British command of the oceans and the ability to cripple France’s maritime commerce 
with blockades. The decisive result of the uncontested blockades, Mahan argued, was that 
it drove Napoleon to institute a Continental blockade of English goods, which, in turn, 
led to privations that forced Czar Alexander I to defy Napoleon and open his ports to 
British merchant ships.135  In return, according to Mahan, Napoleon launched his fateful 
campaign against Russia in 1812, setting in motion a series of defeats that led to his 
inevitable downfall. Hence, the logic went, the disruption of commerce imposed by sea 
power has the ability to cause internal collapse. In other words, wars can be won on sea 
power alone. 
Mackinder readily acknowledged that, after Trafalgar, the British “could deny all 
the ocean to the fleets of her enemies, could transport her armies to whatsoever coast she 
would and remove them again, could carry supplies home from foreign sources, could 
exert pressure in negotiation on whatsoever offending state has a sea-front.”136 While sea 
power was a critical, if not necessary, factor in the British defeat of the French, having 
command of the sea was not always a sufficient condition for achieving the national 
interest. In fact, Mackinder probably would have argued that possessing superior sea 
power is rarely, if ever, a sufficient condition, at least in the long run. However, 
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Mackinder did not purposefully set out to de-bunk the theory of sea power, so much as he 
wanted to put it into its proper perspective. His Heartland theory was a warning to world 
leaders, meant to draw their attention to a part of the world that was, and had been, 
capable of sustaining its owner with the resources necessary to conquer the world on land 
and at sea. When Mackinder presented “The Geographical Pivot of History” to the RGS 
in 1904, he said to his audience: 
I have spoken as a geographer. The actual political balance of political 
power at any given time is, of course, the product … of geographical 
conditions, both economic and strategic, and … of the relative number, 
virility, equipment, and organization of the competing peoples. ... And the 
geographical quantities in the calculation are more nearly constant than the 
human. Hence we should expect to find our formula apply equally to past 
history and to present politics. The social movements of all times have 
played around essentially the same physical features.137 
Basically, Mackinder was less concerned with telling his audience how to fight a war, 
than he was in predicting where the next one might flare up. 
 Mahan’s purpose, of course, was to demonstrate how sea power could be applied 
as a tool of the state to achieve national interests. The limitation of Mahan’s theory of sea 
power is that it relies heavily on the British experience and spans a comparatively finite 
period of time. The near-absolute supremacy of the Royal Navy played an inordinately 
vital role in the welfare of Britain because Britain was an island nation. The obvious 
objection to Mahan’s theory is that it has little applicability to non-maritime nations. 
Thus, Mahan’s conclusion concerning the significance of sea power could be considered 
skewed, in light of the examples he chose to examine.   
Ultimately, Mahan and Mackinder were not diametrically opposing theorists, nor 
would it be fair to say that either was completely right or completely wrong. Regarding 
land power, Mahan might have subordinated its importance to sea power in the sense that 
he viewed commerce as central to national interests in war and peace, and that sea power 
had a greater role in commerce than did land power. Mackinder would likely have ceded 
this point to Mahan, but only in very specific circumstances. Mackinder’s theory of a 
pivot area held greater explanatory power across time and civilizations and, therefore, 
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indicated that land power might hold greater importance in the long run. As Mackinder 
might have otherwise put it, the Heartland is necessary for sea power, but sea power is 





























III. BERNHARDI VS. BLOCH 
Issue: How would industrialization affect the characteristics and conduct of 
war? 
The catastrophic results of World War I are now a matter of public record, 
although the debate over what caused the conflict remains unresolved. Some theories 
emphasized the general militarism of the European theatre, while other theories place 
more weight on the growth of nationalism. Other theories argue that Europe’s complex 
alliance structure allowed a relatively minor incident (e.g., the assassination of Archduke 
Ferdinand) to rapidly and unexpectedly drag the major powers into a continental war. 
Realistically, however, it was a combination of factors that steered the great powers of 
Europe into the Great War. 
 Yet, militarism, nationalism, and alliances were not new concepts in the early 
twentieth century. Indeed, a broad survey of European military history over the past 600 
years would show that the various powers were constantly at war with each other. Thus, 
war was not a novelty to nineteenth or twentieth century European leaders. Perhaps one 
could argue that nationalism, as an outgrowth of the French Revolution, was a 
comparatively recent development, but even that was well over a century old by the time 
of World War I.   
 What was unique in the decades leading up to World War I was the advent of 
mass industrialization. Coupled with militarism, industrialization allowed a country to 
rapidly harness its wealth, resources, and manpower to support wartime mobilization. In 
the conduct of war, industrialization allowed for the delivery of massive amounts of 
firepower and the ability to shift forces around on the battlefield much more quickly than 
in the days of horse and wagon. Although the capabilities and new advances conferred by 
industrialization were hardly in dispute, the effects they would have on the outcome of a 
major European war were.   
Two contemporary thinkers of the time who shared very different visions of 
industrialized warfare and published works on the subject were General Friedrich von 
Bernhardi, a German Cavalry officer, and Ivan Stanislavovich Bloch, a financier and 
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railway planner from Warsaw. In 1912, Bernhardi published On War of Today, in which 
he set out to characterize modern and future warfare. Despite all the new complexities 
introduced in modern warfare, Berhardi believed all these new phenomena could be 
comprehended and tested against principles of modern warfare in order to arrive at 
rational courses of action.138 Bernhardi understood that industrialization had changed the 
means of warfare, particularly in transportation, logistics, and firepower; these new 
means demanded new principles. His primary concern, of course, was for the long-term 
welfare of Germany, and he feared his country’s numerical inferiority to France and 
Russia. Despite Germany having fewer men with which to fill its military ranks, 
Bernhardi believed that swift victory over its adversaries was still possible, provided that 
enough forces could be levied quickly enough and brought to bear at the right place, at 
the right time. 
Ivan Bloch, on the other hand, viewed the outcome of modern warfare much more 
pessimistically than Bernhardi. While he agreed in principle with Bernhardi that 
industrialization had improved the quality of modern armies and the weapons with which 
they fought, Bloch predicted that modern warfare would not entail swift victories. Rather, 
modern warfare would be characterized by a slow, grinding attrition that would 
eventually lead to a devastatingly high number of casualties. Additionally, the weapons 
and resources needed to conduct modern warfare would tax a much greater portion of 
national wealth than they had in the nineteenth century. Industrialized mass warfare, in 
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FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI 
 Bernhardi was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, in 1849, though his parents 
immigrated to the Prussian province of Silesia in 1851. At twenty-one, Bernhardi fought 
in the Franco-Prussian War as a cavalry lieutenant and was the first to ride into Paris 
during the victory procession.139  Following the war and the unification of Germany in 
1871, Bernhardi continued to serve in a variety of command and staff positions. In 1891, 
he served as a military attaché to Bern, Swizerland. Three years later, Bernhardi was 
assigned to head the military history department for the Grand General Staff in Berlin. He 
was assigned as General of the Seventh Army Corps in Westphalia in 1907, but retired 
shortly thereafter in 1909. Berhardi continued to write, and he soon published several 
influential works, including Germany and the Next War (1911) and On War of Today 
(1912). Broadly speaking, his intent with the first was to lay the moral foundation and 
justification for German militarism.140  His purpose with the second was to address the 
general theory and principles underlying modern warfare. Perhaps due to the widespread 
impact of his writings, Bernhardi was recalled to active service during World War I, in 
which he served on both the Eastern and Western fronts. He earned the highest award 
bestowed under the Prussian monarchy, the Pour le Mérit, for meritorious action on the 
Eastern front during Germany’s defense against the Brusilov Offensive in 1916. After the 
war, Bernhardi published his final major work, On War of the Future, in Light of the 
Lessons of the World War, in which he repeated many of the same ideas from his first 
two books and expressed his faith that Germany would once again rise in power, though 
not during his lifetime. Berhardi died in 1930, at the age of 80.141 
 In 1912, Bernhardi wrote, “I am writing for to-day, and have set me the special 
task of depicting and critically examining the effect and importance of the present 
conditions which by their nature are bound to determine the character of modern war, and 
                                                 





the kind of operations in the next war.”142 Although Bernhardi did not explicitly say so, 
the “present conditions” he mentioned most likely alluded to the effects of 
industrialization. Evidently, Bernhardi believed that something in the nature and conduct 
of war had changed during his lifetime; otherwise, he would not have felt the need to 
distinguish between “modern” war and any other type of war. The changes in the nature 
of war were so great, in fact, that they required the development of new types of 
operations to wage successfully. In order to accomplish this task, Bernhardi first 
established a theoretical foundation for modern war, mostly by reviewing past strategic 
theorists, such as Carl von Clausewitz, Baron de Jomini, and the elder Helmut von 
Moltke. Second, he derived certain principles of modern warfare that would 
accommodate the technological and social changes brought about by industrialization. 
Regarding success in future wars, Bernhardi said that “it is more a question of clearly 
discerning the principles which must guide our actions, than of making use of all the 
novelties in technics, and of competing with our enemies in numbers.”143  While this did 
not mean that technology and numerical superiority were not important considerations, 
achieving victory in Industrial Age warfare demanded adjustments in doctrine and 
principles. 
 Bernhardi seemed to accept Clausewitz’s general theory of war, noting that “the 
past, the present, and the future are invariably dominated by the general laws which are 
always and everywhere inherent in war as a social phenomenon.”144 More precisely, he 
accepted Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity as the basis from which to derive principles. To 
make his point on the matter of theory, Bernhardi contrasted his methodology by 
describing that of Jomini: 
It takes the successful combats of victorious generals as the basis of its 
reflections; tries to prove a certain constancy in these combats; deduces 
from this constancy certain rules and principles, and then, attributing them 
a general validity, frames on them a theory of war… . When we read 
[Jomini], there is apparently nothing problematic in war; rules and laws 
insuring success are laid down for every act, and we begin to think that 
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[Napoleon] gained his laurels merely by the fact that he conscientiously 
adhered to the rules construed by his wars … after the events.145 
This was a slight misinterpretation of Jomini, as he did not purport that adhering to his 
rules and laws would always ensure success. Nevertheless, this criticism of Jomini was 
common enough, and understandably so amongst Prussian officers who had been so 
influenced by Clausewitz.   
 Bernhardi’s inspiration toward an applied theory of war was Moltke the Elder, 
who served as the Chief of Staff for the Prussian Army from 1857 to 1887. The key 
lesson that Bernhardi drew from Moltke was that any practical theory of war must 
ultimately guide the strategist in determining “what in war is altogether possible and 
feasible.”146 Moltke, who was himself a disciple of Clausewitz, argued that the outcomes 
of war become more uncertain the further into the future one tries to predict them. In any 
calculation of the future, the variables will be a mix of known and unknown factors. 
Thus, Moltke concluded, any measures of success or failure can only be based on what is 
probable.147  Expanding on the concept of probability, Bernhardi argued that all the 
known factors in war, such as “frictions, moral influences, chances, and personal 
elements” become known through war experience, and are of “far-reaching 
importance.”148  Taken altogether, the known factors make up the realm of what is 
possible in war.   
Yet, the realm of the feasible was more important to Bernhardi, as his ultimate 
goal was to develop a theory of war that was applicable to his own time. Comprehending 
what might be feasible, Bernhardi said, requires examining 
…under what external and internal conditions a future war must probably 
be conducted; how the conduct of the war will be affected by the changes 
in military matters since [the] last experiences in war; what effects these 
changes will produce. … In this way alone can we succeed in ascertaining 
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the conditions that will probably obtain in the next war, and in gaining 
some guiding rules for our action.149  
In the quest for greater certainty, Bernhardi was cautious in using the past as a predictor 
of the future. Past wars, he noted, had played themselves out in unexpected ways. For 
example, some wars dragged on without ever leading to a decisive end. Some wars were 
characterized by a slow attrition of the weaker side. In some other wars, the numerically 
inferior force achieved decisive victory over the stronger army.150 In cases where a 
seemingly weaker side overcame a stronger enemy, Bernhardi attributed the outcome to 
two reasons. One reason is the existence of some particular variable or circumstance that 
resulted in an advantage for the weaker force. This variable could be anything, such as “a 
happy coincidence of favourable conditions; a numerical or tactical superiority; a special 
kind of armament; a moral superiority inherent in the character of an army; or a superior 
principle of acting.”151 The second reason, Bernhardi noted, is the genius of the 
commander, which has the power to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.152 Bernhardi 
was particularly interested in the notion of the weaker achieving victory over the stronger 
because this dynamic mirrored his own understanding of the Prussian military 
experience, which he characterized as a long history of military leaders that were forced 
by disadvantageous circumstances to make the complex calculations needed to 
understand what was feasible and, ultimately, necessary for victory. His next challenge, 
then, was to derive the actual principles of modern war that would translate what was 
feasible into action. 
 As a starting point for his principles, Bernhardi proposed three factors of war that 
are immutable and universally true under any and all conditions. First, the object of war, 
as Clausewitz had once argued, is to impose one’s will on the enemy by destroying or 
physically hurting him. Second, every military action is characterized by one of two 
possible forms: offensive or defensive. Third, war is fundamentally a human activity, 
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expressed by the “physical, mental, and moral qualities of men.”153  Bernhardi added, 
“All laws and principles which can be derived directly and purely from these three factors 
must evidently be looked upon as permanent laws and of general application in war, 
which retain their decisive influence under all circumstances.”154 These permanent 
factors pertain to what Bernhard referred to as constancy in war.   
Bernhardi also addressed a second type of principle that he characterized as 
having “transient validity.”155  As the term suggests, such principles were applicable only 
within the social context of a particular period in history. Or, as Bernhardi put it, “A 
lasting validity can be attributed to constancy only in so far as it is part of the nature of 
war itself and independent of whatever form a war assumes.”156  Thus, principles or laws 
of transient validity require “constantly to be checked and further developed to remain of 
practical use, and not hamper the freedom of action by dead routine.”157 Bernhardi 
acknowledged the many difficulties in identifying any principles of warfare, due to 
objections regarding the veracity of the evidence, divergent interpretations of war 
experiences, or differing world views. He argued, however, that it would “never be 
possible to arrive at incontrovertible results in all that concerns military matters, … but 
we must rely on the theory of probabilities.”158 
The principles of modern warfare that Bernhardi sought were of the transient 
variety and were influenced by the wide-spread social and technological changes brought 
about by the Industrial Revolution. Through his theoretical approach to war, Bernhardi 
first explored the major developments that had surfaced in the conduct of war due to 
industrialization, and then proposed a new set of principles with which to plan the next 
war. Accordingly, Berhardi began his analysis with the advent of nationalism and mass 
armies.  “Of all the features which are destined to influence the conduct of war under 
present conditions, and cause it to strike new lines,” he declared, “it is the levy of masses, 
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above all, which no doubt will give its peculiar stamp to the next war.”159 Though 
Bernhardi did not believe this was true of all warfare everywhere, he did see armies of 
masses as the common organizational characteristic of the great powers in Europe. 
Unlike in the past, he observed, modern armies were such that it was “right to some 
extent to speak of the armies of millions of modern times, the like of which have not been 
seen before in history.”160  While industrialization tied the masses to the country’s 
economy and brought them greater wealth, it consequently tied their interests directly to 
war as well. Unlike the days of monarchs hiring professional armies to settle political 
scores, modern warfare ensured that its effects were felt across all social strata and 
classes. Thus, warfare could no longer be confined to the narrow interests of kings and 
princes, nor could its costs be contained. In an age where entire nations went to war 
against each other, Bernhardi warned, “The sacrifice in wealth and blood that must be 
exacted will probably surpass everything we have experienced hitherto; and the dangers 
of such enterprise, moreover, as well as the evil consequences of defeat in war, will be far 
greater than ever.”161  
Acknowledging the high cost of both preparing for, and conducting modern 
warfare, Bernhardi readily identified the core counterargument to his thesis that modern 
warfare was feasible: 
It has been asserted and seemingly substantiated scientifically, that no 
State could carry through a war at all, waged with the masses levied in our 
days. It would not only mean absolute domestic ruin, but war itself would 
be completely paralyzed by the want of means that could not fail to be felt 
soon after its outbreak; the economic strength for maintaining such huge 
armies would simply fail. For this reason alone a war of that nature 
between two civilized nations would become impossible.162 
Bernhardi countered by arguing that economic hardship brought on by war does not 
manifest itself immediately. In other words, inflation caused by wartime expenses do not 
hit the population overnight, so any shocks to the economic system of the state are 
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weathered gradually. Furthermore, the enemy would economically feel a similar pain and 
would be forced to make many of the same adjustments to its domestic policy, whatever 
those might be, such that a pre-existing advantage may be maintained.163   
To illustrate how this might play out in a wartime setting, Bernhardi proposed 
using reserve forces to fulfill domestic agricultural and industrial requirements while not 
engaged in military operations. The victor in the initial decisive battles would then be 
afforded the ability to de-mobilize the rear echelon, because the danger of a hostile 
counter-attack or invasion would be gone. The defeated party, economically unable to re-
establish the balance of power, would then be likely to pursue peace terms. Even in the 
event that the struggle ends up in a stalemate, victory will ultimately go to whichever side  
…can boast of the highest moral energy and self-sacrificing spirit, or, 
where on both sides the moral motives are of an equally high standard, can 
hold out financially the longest to finish the war. In this way the factors 
ruling the conduct of war will automatically adapt themselves, as it were, 
to the economic conditions, and a compromise between what was intended 
and what was possible will of necessity be the result.164 
Thus, Bernhardi concluded, two practical lessons become evident. First, the economic 
superiority of a nation and the stewardship of its finances, become “essential factor[s] for 
success.”165 Second, material and economic preparations for war cannot be done half-
heartedly or sporadically. On this point, Bernhardi warned of extremely dire 
consequences, should a nation fail to arm itself adequately. The danger of defeat was so 
great, in fact, that “even the greatest sacrifices for armaments seem justified by 
themselves and under all circumstances.”166  
 Yet, the mass armies characteristic of the Industrial Age were problematic in 
terms of war conduct, as well as economic cost. Because of their relative unwieldiness 
compared to smaller units, the movement, supply, transport, and concentration of mass 
forces were much more difficult to execute. However, the modern railroad networks 
mitigated many of these disadvantages by enhancing the “strategic mobility” of mass 
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armies.167 In times of war, all rail lines would be under military authority, at least in 
Germany. In 1912, Germany’s steam-powered trains could attain a speed of 138 
kilometers per hour, enabling the transport of large numbers of troops and equipment 
across the country in a matter of hours.168 Use of the railways also ensured sufficient 
freedom of action for commanders by relieving combat troops from having to maintain 
and guard their own supply lines.169 Bernhardi cited other forms of motorized transport, 
such as vans, lorries, buses, motorcycles, and automobiles, that could also be made 
available for military use, though mostly on the battlefield.170  The railroad, however, 
was the key strategic asset. 
 Regarding size of the modern army, Bernahardi was concerned about the 
fascination with possessing large numbers of troops. As a result of the combination of the 
Industrial Revolution and the growth of nationalism and, hence, national armies, the 
fixation on mass by the European powers as reliable indicator of strength seemed natural. 
Bernhardi, however, warned that “this faith in numbers is a delusive idea.”171 From a 
theoretical standpoint, Bernhardi said that the tendency to focus on numbers made sense 
at the time, because the size of an army was the only empirical measure of strength. 
However, numerical strength as the single-most determining factor presumed that all 
other factors, whether tangible or intangible, were of equivalent value between 
adversaries. Placing too much emphasis on mass ignored various other factors, such as 
training, leadership, doctrine, and equipment. In fact, Bernhardi argued, history has 
shown that numerical superiority is often not the decisive factor. Often, it had been the 
restrictions of the terrain or battlefield formation which prevented the commander from 
effectively employing his full contingent of troops. Such was the case at the Battle of 
Arcole, where Napoleon, with fewer troops, relied on brilliant maneuver to enable his 
army to bring full force to bear on the Austrians.172  In another example, the numerically 
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superior Persians at Marathon were unable to deploy all of their troops at once, due to the 
battlefield’s restrictive terrain. Nor was a numerically superior army of any added benefit 
to the Persians during maritime operations.173  More recently, Bernhardi added, the 
experience of the Russo-Japanese War exposed a key limitation of mass armies. In this 
case, time constraints prevented the Russians from concentrating their vastly superior 
numbers at the right moment.   The key insight that Bernhardi gained from these and 
several other examples is that “it is the tactical and operative clumsiness of armies which 
makes it impossible for them to use their superior numbers effectively in the face of a 
more mobile and tactically better organized enemy.”174  Even from a broad strategic 
perspective, numerical superiority was never a guarantee of victory. As Bernhardi noted, 
“The Romans conquered the world with inferior numbers; and we need only open the 
great book of Prussian history to become aware of this fact from our own glorious 
past.”175  
 Clearly, factors other than numbers must come into play during calculations of 
strength. Within the context of modern warfare, Bernhardi asserted: 
the moral worth of troops … gains decisive importance in addition to 
numbers, and this … will weigh all the more heavily on the scale. The 
capability of modern troops to endure fatigues and fight with energy, and 
their moral strength under privations and disaster depend, under modern 
conditions, on many other things, and differ, therefore, much more from 
those prevailing at the time of professional armies, which contained … 
numerous old warriors, who had faced death a hundred times.176 
This did not mean that numbers were not important measure of strength. However, 
Bernhardi did not see a direct relationship between larger numbers and increases in 
strength. In some cases, an increase in numbers might involve a trade-off in decreased 
moral and tactical value of troops, and would, therefore, be counter-productive. 
Consequently, Bernhardi argued that the true measure of actual strength should not be 
calculated on numbers alone, but rather by the aggregate force which an army could 
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apply at any given place and time to decisive effect.177 Since all the great European 
powers in the modern era either possessed standing national armies or the ability to 
mobilize them quickly, Bernhardi concluded that the only way to achieve victory in the 
modern era was to develop new ways of conducting war.   
 Although Bernhardi conducted a very comprehensive analysis of the technical 
developments of modern war, he cited the improved range, accuracy and destructive 
power of modern arms as the most significant.178 In particular, Bernhardi predicted that 
the advancements in firearms would fundamentally change the way the infantry, the 
artillery, and the cavalry were employed on the battlefield. Maintaining Clausewitz’s 
dictum that the destruction of the enemy’s army must be the objective in war, Bernhardi 
acknowledged that the infantry remained the decisive arm of battle.179  However, 
increased range and rate of fire for rifles meant that closed infantry formations could no 
longer approach an objective without exposing themselves to devastating fire. 
Consequently, infantry would have to begin dispersing themselves as far out as 2,000 
meters from the enemy and approach the objective and “fight as a single rank in loose 
skirmishing lines.”180 Once within range of a defender’s fire, the infantry would be 
forced to advance rushing, crawling, or both, until within about 800 to 1000 meters of the 
objective. At that point, the infantry would wait to conduct the final assault until either 
their own small arms or artillery fire had sufficiently softened the defensive positions.181   
 Significantly, however, Bernhardi pointed out that attacking infantry that have 
already dispersed into an extended rank configuration consequently lose their ability to 
maneuver. At this point, only forward or backward movements for the attacking infantry 
are viable options. In fact, Bernhardi wrote, the whole character of the infantry fight had 
changed, such that: 
While it was formerly a question of leading men forward in more or less 
closed bodies, under the direct control of their officers, with a portion only 
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of the men extended in skirmishing lines or swarms, all the fighting troops 
now move in an extended order, where each man fights and acts 
individually. Officers can no longer assert a direct influence, as formerly; 
the greater noise … renders it more difficult for orders to be heard.182 
Furthermore, the recent addition of automatic weapons into the modern arsenal made 
infantry assaults a much riskier proposition than had previously been the case. While 
Bernhardi did not believe that automatic rifles would change the tactics of attacking 
infantry, he did assess however, he argued that they would provide greater killing power 
to defending infantry. Putting such weapons in the hands of the attacking infantry would 
result in little more than a lot of wasted ammunition.183   
As for crew-served machine guns, Bernhardi was similarly critical. In addition to 
the maintenance hassles, employing machine guns in concert with an infantry advance 
risked limiting freedom of action. Also, effective use of the machine gun relied on several 
special circumstances, such as favorable terrain and mutual fire from other guns.184  Even 
for infantry in the defense, Bernhardi questioned the extent of the machine gun’s value. 
Assuming favorable terrain for the defense, Bernhardi argued that operator error and 
mechanical breakdowns made the machine gun, on the whole, unreliable. Ultimately, 
therefore, the infantry assault remained the decisive action in modern warfare, yet, 
paradoxically, its ability to maneuver had been limited by advances in firearms 
technology. One could easily envision multiple machine gun positions tearing down 
waves of attacking infantry in World War I, though Bernhardi did not appear to predict 
this. He did suggest conducting movement at night in order to prevent the defenders from 
spotting the attackers’ advance, although this plan failed to account for land mines, 
shrapnel, and illumination flares. 
As with rifles and automatic weapons, industrialization played a major role in 
increasing the battlefield utility of artillery. For some time during nineteenth century 
warfare, mostly smaller guns (i.e., present day mortars) were used in battle. However, the 
smaller guns were only effective against troops in the open, so light and heavy howitzers 
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had been recently re-introduced to target entrenched infantry with exploding shrapnel. 
While heavy guns could be used to target infantry in the open, they were also effective in 
destroying field fortifications.185 At the time, the German Army was only using the 
heavy howitzer, due to its ability to target both personnel and equipment. Prior to its re-
introduction, the howitzer had fallen into disuse because of frequent mechanical 
breakdowns and insufficient rate of fire.186 Industrialization led to advancements in the 
guns and the rapid production of munitions, making the howitzer a cost-effective and 
necessary addition to the battlefield. Aside from a Germany’s failure to update its 
howitzers with fixed ammunition cartridges, as other European powers had done, 
Bernhardi believed that this modification would be made soon, thereby putting the 
artillery capability amongst the European powers on relative equal ground.187 
Regarding the cavalry, Bernhardi argued that its role in modern warfare would 
fundamentally change. Behind this change, Bernhardi said, are firearms, which “have 
altogether changed the conditions under which cavalry can act, conditions which the 
cavalry cannot disregard without losing its place in modern war.”188 Similar to the 
infantry, the cavalry in modern war would be forced to alter its tactical formations, or risk 
catastrophic losses from long-range, but accurate, small-arms fire, or by shrapnel. Unlike 
the infantry, however, the cavalry would have a different purpose on the modern 
battlefield. The traditional and almost singular role of the cavalry had always been to 
charge the flanks or rear of the infantry, or, depending on circumstances, to attack 
vulnerable artillery behind the main infantry lines. However, the traditional cavalry 
charge had only been decisive when the infantry fought with inaccurate firearms and, 
consequently, could not engage from a distance. Against melee infantry opponents, the 
cavalry charge had long been the coup de grâce. Bernhardi observed, however, that with 
modern firearms, the traditional cavalry charge could be engaged from a distance and 
neutralized. In fact, he argued, the role of the cavalry acting in decisive concert with the 
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infantry and artillery was a remnant of a bygone era.189  Bernhardi proposed instead 
several new roles for the cavalry. The primary non-combat tasks for modern cavalry 
would be reconnaissance and screening.190 Becoming decisively engaged was only 
advisable when in contact with other cavalry units. Otherwise, the cavalry were expected 
to conduct swift attacks and raids on lightly-defended positions, particularly the enemy’s 
lines of communication. Because of the massive size of modern armies, Bernhardi argued 
that this was a critical task, since doing so would cut off supplies to the main enemy 
force.191 When not engaged, the cavalry would remain on the flanks of friendly forces, 
mainly to cover a friendly retreat. However, Bernhardi also proposed that modern 
cavalry, armed with modern weapons, and supported with modern logistics, would also 
be able to conduct pursuit operations, unlike their predecessors. Unconstrained by 
logistics, modern cavalry could use their enhanced range and lethality to decisively defeat 
retreating enemy forces. They could also rapidly shift where required on the battlefield, 
making them the ideal force for exploiting any opportunity during battle.192  
Overall, Bernhardi’s assessments suggested that, on a material and technological 
level, the European powers were more or less on the same footing in 1912. In his analysis 
of the infantry, artillery, and cavalry, Bernhardi did not view any one country’s forces or 
soldiers as markedly superior to another, whether in terms of training, technical expertise, 
or equipment.   While numerical superiority would logically be the decisive factor, 
Bernhardi showed that this was not, nor ever had it been, the case. Bernhardi explained: 
The reason for this apparent inconsistency is very simple. The way of 
conducting war … gives victory to the one or the other party. … The 
superiority which one or the other side may thus obtain, may … 
compensate for the original inferiority, and thus procure for the weaker 
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conquering the stronger enemy. But for such a success we must always 
presume superior leadership, which can change almost everything to its 
favour.193 
Nevertheless, Bernhardi realized that there was a limit to what great generalship on the 
battlefield could accomplish in the face of overwhelming enemy forces. Even the most 
genius of maneuvers or the most efficient use of resources could not achieve victory if 
the numbers of the enemy precluded decisive action. Bernhardi hypothesized that there 
must be a relationship between the importance of numerical strength and the effects of 
great leadership. He expressed this idea in the “law of numbers,” which basically said 
that the greater the numbers of the adversary, the lower the probability that the genius of 
a general could compensate for his own inferior numbers.194 Although Bernhardi could 
not quantify this probability, he maintained that historical examples of inferior forces 
overcoming larger armies proved his theory was valid. 
 By 1912, the effects of industrialization had essentially leveled the playing field 
in Europe, regarding weaponry, logistics, training, and equipment. Because of the sheer 
size of the national armies amongst the competing European powers, the next war would 
certainly be much bloodier than it had been in the past. In order to achieve decisive 
advantage in modern warfare, new tactics and principles were necessary. All other 
consideration being roughly equivalent, the decisive factor in modern war, Bernhardi 
concluded, was the “superior principle of acting.”195 This principle praised bold and 
decisive behavior.  “All great captains,” he said, “gave preference to the offensive which 
afforded great scope to their energies.”196 On a grand scale numbers were certainly 
important. However, mass provided no advantage if it could not be maneuvered and its 
energy focused at the decisive point in space and time. Only a fraction of the army could 
participate in any given battle at any given time, so the total size of one’s army was not 
decisive in itself. The key to victory, Bernhardi said, “is above all a question of 
discerning the weak points inherent in the modern military system and the conduct of 
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war. Only by recognizing this fact may we succeed in arriving at a standard of acting, 
which will ensure us a superiority, on which we can rely.”197  As a follower of 
Clausewitz, Bernhardi embraced the idea of applying maximum combat power at the 
decisive point, and he accepted the dictum that the destruction of the enemy’s forces must 
always be the object of military action. Ultimately, Bernhardi believed that 
accomplishing these ends was possible in the age of modern war, as long as one adjusted 
the tactics and conduct of operations to account for the changes brought on by 
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IVAN STANISLAVOVICH BLOCH 
 Originally born as Jan Gotlib Bloch in July of 1836, Ivan Bloch’s professional 
occupations were that of a banker, railway financier, political theorist, and economic 
analyst. He left Poland to study at the University of Berlin, and worked at a Warsaw bank 
following graduation. Later, he moved to St. Petersburg, Russia, where he worked as a 
financier for Russian Railways and established several banking and insurance 
companies.198  In Russia, he was known as Ivan Stanislavovich Bloch. In 1877, he was 
appointed to sit on the Russian Finance Ministry’s Scientific Committee.   
During his tenure at the ministry, Bloch began analyzing the effects of 
industrialization and new technologies on modern warfare. The recent Prussian victory 
over France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 led Bloch to theorize that warfare as 
a means to resolve political differences amongst the great powers of Europe was 
becoming obsolete. The unexpected defeat of the numerically superior French forces, 
suggested that the Prussians had made more efficient use of their railways to rapidly 
move large numbers of troops to where they were needed. Furthermore, the Franco-
Prussian War also demonstrated the superior logistics and tactical maneuvers of the 
Prussian armies. Prussia’s more efficient use of its capabilities and material resources 
enabled it to mobilize more men than France, despite the fact that France had a greater 
population at the start of the war.199  Bloch believed, however, that the advantage which 
the German states enjoyed during the war had eroded since then. By the time Bloch 
published Is War Now Impossible?, in 1898, he  argued that none of the major European 
powers wielded any decisive capability over another. The next war, he concluded, would 
be one of attrition, so ruinous to the economies and populations of the participants, that it 
would be impractical. In 1899, Bloch distributed copies of his manuscript to several 
delegates at the first Hague Peace Conference, yet the admonitions contained within it 
                                                 
198 Wikipedia, “Jan Gotlib Bloch,” accessed September 28, 2012, 
http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Jan_Gotlib_Bloch. 
199 Wikipedia, “Franco-Prussian War,” accessed September 28, 2012, 
http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Franco-Prussian_War.  
 59 
failed to impress Europe’s military or political leadership.200  Bloch died on December 
25, 1902. 
Key to understanding Bloch’s thesis regarding the impossibility of war is the 
context in which he viewed the subject. When pressed by his British publicist, 
W.T.Stead, as to whether or not his thesis referred to all wars, Bloch responded that the 
scope of his analysis concerned only the great Powers of Europe, not the “minor 
States.”201   For the minor states of Europe, starting a war was no longer even thinkable: 
It is as impossible for Denmark or for Belgium to make war to-day as it 
would be for you or for me to assert the right of private war, which our 
forefathers possessed. We cannot do it. At least, we could only try to do it, 
and then be summarily suppressed and punished for our temerity. … They 
are in the position of the descendants of the feudal lords, whose right of 
levying war has vanished, owing to the growth of a strong central power 
whose interests and authority are incompatible with the exercise of what 
used to be at one time an almost universal right. For the minor States, 
therefore, war is impossible. … Impossible, that is to say, without the 
leave and licence of the great Powers.202 
The war of the future, Bloch predicted, would most likely be a contest between the 
Franco-Russian alliance and the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and 
Italy.203 Unlike many of his detractors who believed with moral certitude that war in the 
modern era was not only possible, but winnable, Bloch argued that the great Powers were 
deluding themselves into thinking that they could overcome the material realities of 
modern war:   
The very development that has taken place in the mechanism of war has 
rendered war in impracticable operation. The dimensions of modern 
armaments and the organisation of society have rendered its prosecution 
an economic impossibility, and , finally, if any attempt to were made to 
demonstrate the inaccuracy of my assertions by putting the matter to a test 
on a grand scale, we should find the inevitable result in a catastrophe 
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which would destroy all existing political organisations. Thus, the great 
war cannot be made, and any attempt to make it would result in suicide.204 
When asked how confident he was in his assessments, Bloch responded that his research 
spanned many years, and that he had consulted several military officers from different 
countries. In consideration of all the experts and officers he had interviewed, Bloch 
concluded that there was essentially “not much difference of opinion as to the general 
conclusions as to the nature of future warfare.”205 The disagreement, he said, was over 
whether wars were still winnable. 
 Of all the developments and advancements in technology that had transformed the 
conduct of war, the small-caliber magazine rifle was, according to Bloch, most 
responsible for turning warfare into an impractical endeavor. Prior to the magazine rifle’s 
development, accuracy beyond a few hundred meters was dubious, at best. Furthermore, 
the rate of fire on the battlefield had been limited by the speed at which the infantry were 
capable of loading and re-loading individual rounds by hand. The invention of the 
cartridge allowed the modern infantryman to accurately fire, in Bloch’s estimation, sixty 
rounds per minute.206 More importantly, the effective range of the bullets fired from 
these newer rifles was projected to increase from 660 yards to 1210 yards within a few 
years after Bloch conducted his analysis.207 In effect, the lethality of the modern infantry 
reduced almost completely the likelihood of close-in or melee combat. Decisive cavalry 
charges or mass formations of infantry overrunning the enemy were anachronistic by the 
end of the nineteenth century, Bloch argued. Instead, armies would be inclined to 
entrench themselves in fortified earthworks, thereby enabling the defenders to shoot at 
any rushing attackers from positions of relative safety. With attacking infantry unable to 
simultaneously shoot and move, the defense would wield an enormous advantage.208  
 Even in the event that the attackers could muster a significant numerical 
superiority over the defenders, Bloch predicted a similar outcome, albeit with more losses 
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on the attacker’s side. Aside from having to overcome the primary fortification of the 
defense, the attackers would also have to make it through secondary obstacles within its 
vicinity. The losses of the attacking force would be so devastating, as a result, that the 
remainder would likely be insufficient to overrun the fortified position.  “To overcome 
these obstacles,” Bloch said, “great sacrifices must be made.”209 
 In addition to the infantry, the cavalry would be similarly limited. Drawing on his 
interviews with several military generals in the European theater, Bloch accepted that the 
new role of the cavalry would less decisive than it had been in pre-Industrial times. Just 
as vulnerable on the open battlefield as the infantry, the cavalry would no longer be able 
to charge into the enemy ranks without exposing itself to deadly fire. Survivability of the 
cavalry in open battle would be one-third that of the infantryman, due to the power of 
modern firearms.210  Bloch agreed with the idea of some military generals that the 
cavalry should be kept distant from the main force, and that its main focus should be on 
conducting strategic reconnaissance or raids on enemy lines of communication.211  Using 
the cavalry in a major engagement with enemy forces was simply impractical, unless a 
commander was willing to lose a disproportionately higher number of horses and men 
than his opponent. In some cases, the cavalry might be directed to pursue a retreating 
enemy, but Bloch dismissed the significance of this task, arguing that it would be too 
easy for the enemy to simply fall back into prepared defensive positions, thereby forcing 
the exhausted cavalry to fight against fresh infantry once again. The more important role 
for the cavalry in this instance, Bloch argued, would be to intercept any reinforcements 
far away from the defenders’ position. Even so, Bloch added, these new roles for the 
cavalry had not yet been vetted through experience. Consequently, he could only estimate 
the cavalry’s effectiveness in these roles. In the major battles of modern war, however, 
the ratio of combat effectiveness of the infantryman to the cavalryman had essentially 
been reversed.212 
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 Regarding artillery, Bloch believed that losses in this branch of the service would 
be equally as devastating as in the infantry and, potentially, the cavalry. The armies of the 
future, he said, would be entirely dependent upon the artillery in order to defeat 
entrenched infantry.213 However, the modernization and mass production of artillery, 
advancements in the range and destructive power of munitions, and improvement in 
tactics meant that the comparative quality of each side’s artillery would be roughly the 
same. The first exchange of fire in battle would occur between the artillery, and it would 
be incumbent upon each side to annihilate the other. Thus, Bloch reasoned, the attacker 
would have to bring more artillery to the fight than the defender possessed in order to 
have a chance at victory. Nevertheless, even if the attacker possessed considerably more 
artillery pieces than the defender, the likely result would still be mutual destruction. The 
losses sustained by the artillery service would be so great “that their action will be 
paralyzed, or the losses in the army will become so tremendous that war itself will be 
impossible.”214  
 Ultimately, Bloch’s thesis rested on material considerations. As he told W.T. 
Stead, “I am not dealing with moral considerations, which cannot be measured, but with 
hard matter-of-fact, material things, which can be estimated and measured with some 
approximation to absolute accuracy.”215  Industrialization had provided the great 
European powers the means with which to make war upon one another using the full 
resources of the State. However, the process of waging near total war would inevitably 
bankrupt the economy. Bloch estimated that it would collectively require £1.46 billion a 
year, just to feed the troops in a war of the scale that was under discussion in the Dual 
and Triple Alliance countries.216 The richest country could ill-afford that price, he 
argued. Even if a country were to pay for the war on credit, the resulting inflation would 
drive up domestic prices to unbearable levels. Furthermore, even if domestic prices were 
kept within tolerance, meeting internal demand for goods would be logistically difficult. 
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Since railroads would likely be shifted to military use in the event of war, they would be 
unavailable to transport food and supplies to civilians. Because of the massive population 
shifts caused by industrialization, significant portions of the population lived in urban 
areas where food was not produced and, therefore, relied on what came in from the rural 
areas. Bloch reasoned that the railroads were critical to transporting food into these 
densely-populated areas, and that supply problems would soon occur after the rail 
capacity was diverted to the war effort.217  Consequently, internal domestic pressures 
would be as great a concern for the government as existential threats from other 
countries. Even dealing with moral considerations, Bloch might have argued that here, 
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Analysis 
 Bernhardi and Bloch agreed with each other on many issues related to modern 
warfare. Both recognized the effects of industrialization on the massive size of modern 
armies and on the ways which war would be conducted in the future. Industrialization 
had enabled governments to mobilize armies that numbered in the millions, and the 
expansion of the railway systems in the major European countries allowed for the rapid 
deployment of soldiers and equipment across hundreds of miles. They agreed that 
industrialization had effectively leveled the playing field in terms of quantity and quality 
of equipment and weaponry. They also agreed that improvements in the accuracy and 
range of the rifle were the most significant technological factors affecting the conduct of 
modern war. Both saw similar new roles for the cavalry, infantry, and artillery. Both 
envisioned that a large portion of a future war would be fought in the trenches, and that 
war, from an empirical standpoint, would be a stalemate. 
 However, Bernhardi and Bloch differed on whether that stalemate could be 
broken. Unlike Bloch, Bernhardi argued that moral factors and good leadership could 
turn the tide in battle as it had in Germany’s Prussian past. Bernhardi correctly 
understood that numerical superiority in itself was not a guarantee of victory. Conversely, 
numerical inferiority was no predictor of defeat. Thus, his reasoning went, if one could 
channel the intangible strengths, such as “moral worth,” and combine them with superior 
maneuver, the stalemate could be broken and any disadvantage in number could be 
overcome.   
 By Bernhardi’s own admission, however, the infantry would only be able to move 
forward or backwards and would, therefore, have little opportunity for maneuver. 
Because of the modern rifle’s accuracy and rate of fire, attacking infantry would be 
rushing across open ground while exposed to a hail of bullets from hundreds of yards 
away. Without the ability to move laterally to any significant degree, the attacking 
infantry would remain within the defenders’ line of fire during the entire approach. It is 
doubtful that any degree of morale, whether high or low, would have made any difference 
in battle under these conditions.   
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That is not to say that military genius or an aggressive mindset did not have a role 
to play during major operations in World War I. Indeed, had Britain not assisted the 
French at the First Battle of the Marne, and had Russia not mobilized its army as quickly 
as it had in the East, Germany might well have achieved the quick, decisive victory 
envisioned by the Schlieffen Plan and avoided the subsequent war of entrenchments 
along its two fronts. In an attempt to break the trench warfare stalemate, the German 
Spring Offensive of 1918 was, comparatively speaking, very successful. But, even with 
such gains on the battlefield, the Germans were unable to supply their forces and 
eventually ceded the territory they had captured. As Bloch might have said to Bernhardi, 
there are limits to how much moral strength will overpower hunger and deprivation.   
 From Bloch’s perspective, the results of World War I would not have surprised 
him, had he lived to see them. All the countries involved incurred massive war debts, 
though some more than others. The domestic unrest he foresaw led to a revolution in 
Russia and the end of an empire in Germany. Although there were undoubtedly quick and 
decisive battles throughout the conflict, none would have won the war so long as there 
were more troops ready and willing to mobilize. The magazine rifle and the machine gun 
enabled one infantryman to kill multiple targets at greater speed, thereby making any 
attempt to cross open ground between trench lines almost suicidal. By the end of the war 
casualties numbered in the tens of millions.   
One could argue that Bloch was wrong, and that war was possible. After all, the 
Allies did win, albeit at enormous cost in lives and property. Furthermore, the horrors of 
World War I did not seem to discourage the same countries from getting involved in 
another world war twenty years later. Perhaps if Bloch had foreseen the advent of the 
tank, he might have viewed the possibility of victory differently. Yet, this is doubtful, as 
Bloch was concerned with the larger forces at work in the age of industrial warfare. 
Weapons were important, but the ability of a country to economically and politically 
sustain such a conflict was just as critical. Modern warfare was empowered by the forces 
of industrialization, such that war no longer had a logical stopping mechanism. Thus, 
even after World War I, Bloch would have adhered to his original thesis. The 
 66 
‘impossibility’ of modern war did not mean that war could not be conducted. Rather, 






























IV. DOUHET VS. MITCHELL 
Issue: How should air power be incorporated into military strategy? 
From the first hot-air balloons of the mid-1700s, to the Zeppelin airships in the 
early 1900s, governments and individual innovators alike recognized the potential of 
flight for military and commercial purposes. Jean-Pierre Blanchard’s hot-air balloon 
flight over the English Channel in 1785 and Dupuy de Lome’s construction of a large 
navigable balloon in 1872 are just two examples of many that highlight man’s continuous 
quest to conquer the skies.218  By the time the Wright brothers conducted their historic 
flight in 1903, the concept of military aviation had been around for well over a century.   
 However, the development of the airplane in the beginning of the twentieth 
century altered the way some military theorists thought about war and its future conduct. 
Italian air force officer Giulio Douhet and American air force officer Billy Mitchell were 
two such theorists who saw the airplane as more than simply another tool of war. The 
airplane, they argued, should be the centerpiece of strategy. At first, their enthusiasm for 
the airplane met with institutional resistance from the entrenched interests of the army 
and navy in both countries, and both men shared the dubious honor of being court-
martialed for criticizing the official view of their superiors concerning the proper role of 
air power. In the aftermath of World War I, Douhet and Mitchell published their theories 
of air power in Command of the Air (1921) and Winged Defense (1925), respectively. 
Although they agreed on the importance of the airplane in future conflict, Mitchell took a 
more nuanced approach, arguing that air power had civil and commercial benefits, in 
addition to military application. Douhet, on the other hand, seemed less interested in the 
commercial applications of aviation. Rather he simply equated air power with the ability 




                                                 




 Born in Caserta, Italy in 1869, Giulio Douhet was commissioned as an artillery 
officer in the Italian Army in 1882. As the airplane was being refined in the first decade 
of the 1900s, Douhet thought deeply about its future impact on war, and from 1912 to 
1915, he commanded the first Italian Army air unit.219 By the time Italy entered World 
War I, Douhet had already developed most of his theories concerning air power, and was 
particularly focused on using bombing campaigns to degrade the morale of an enemy 
population.220 With Italy seemingly locked in a stalemate with Austria in 1915, Douhet 
urged a strategic bombing campaign against Austrian cities with a force of 500 aircraft. 
Having had his proposals rejected, Douhet criticized his superiors’ conduct of the war in 
a memorandum to the Italian cabinet, and was subsequently court-martialed and jailed for 
a year.221  Following his release, Douhet was recalled to duty and assigned as head of the 
Italian Central Aeronautical Bureau in 1918. Douhet was exonerated in 1920, and 
promoted to general the following year, at which time he also published The Command of 
the Air. He retired shortly thereafter, spending the rest of his life writing about airpower, 
publishing Part II of The Command of the Air in 1926. He died in 1930. 222  
 Douhet viewed future conflict through the lens of Total War.  “The prevailing 
forms of social organization,” he said, “have given war a character of national totality—
that is, the entire population and all the resources of a nation are sucked into the maw of 
war. And, since society is now definitely evolving along this line, it is within the power 
of human foresight to see now that future wars will be total in character and scope.”223 
He had witnessed the massive destruction and loss of human life in World War I, blaming 
the outcome on war planners who extolled the virtues of the offense, yet who had failed 
to appreciate the degree to which advanced firearms shifted the advantage to the defense.  
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“The truth, “Douhet wrote, “is that every development or improvement in firearms favors 
the defensive.”224 As other skeptics such as Ivan Bloch had argued prior to World War I, 
it seemed that war had indeed become impossible. 
Douhet acknowledged that waging war had become impossible, but only in the 
context of warfare in which the army and navy were the sole actors.  “War,” he said, “is a 
conflict between two wills basically opposed on to the other. On one side is the party who 
wants to occupy a certain portion of the earth; over against him stands his adversary, the 
party who intends to oppose that occupation, if necessary by force.”225 In total war, a 
defending power was continually forced to extend its lines in order to guard its flanks. 
Eventually, the defensive lines had been extended to such a degree as to make the 
passage of troops in either direction impossible, or too costly.226 Douhet concluded that 
the high casualty rate in World War I was, therefore, inevitable because an attacking 
army had no choice but to fight through the defending force in order to reach its 
objective.   
Air power, Douhet argued, made war possible again. Since the airplane was 
unhindered by the constraints of navigating and fighting on the surface of the earth, it 
could freely travel long distances in the shortest possible time.227  Massive armies and 
navies squaring off in battle would no longer be the decisive element, because planes 
could simply fly over them. Douhet asserted: 
Nothing man can do on the surface of the earth can interfere with a plane 
in flight, moving freely in the third dimension. All the influences which 
have conditioned and characterized warfare from the beginning are 
powerless to affect aerial action. By virtue of this new weapon, the 
repercussions of war are no longer limited by the farthest artillery range of 
surface guns, but can be directly felt for hundreds and hundreds of miles 
over all the lands and seas of nations at war. “228  
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Of course, future events would prove this assertion wrong. Improvements in anti-aircraft 
guns and the development of Surface-to-Air missiles would later deny the freedom of 
maneuver that Douhet envisioned for his airplanes. At the time, however, the airplane 
provided the ability to bypass the defensive lines of the enemy’s army.   
 However, Douhet was more concerned with the strategic implications of air 
power, versus its tactical benefits. The airplane, he argued, would fundamentally change 
the nature of war by drawing the civilian population directly into the conflict through 
aerial attacks. Prior to the airplane, warfare only endangered those who were within the 
radius of a surface weapon’s maximum range. Within a finite battle space, “No enemy 
offensive could menace them beyond that predetermined distance, so civilian life could 
be carried on in safety and comparative tranquility. … And so, though the World War 
sharply affected whole nations, it is nonetheless true that only a minority of the peoples 
involved actually fought and died.”229 In other words, total war had not necessarily 
required all the people of a country to share the burden or hardship of war equally. In 
future wars, everyone would become a combatant, because everyone could be targeted by 
aerial attack. Douhet thus predicted that there would no longer be any distinction between 
civilian and military personnel.  “The defenses on land and sea,” he asserted, “will no 
longer serve to protect the country behind them; nor can victory on land or sea protect the 
people from enemy aerial attacks unless that victory insures the destruction, by actual 
occupation of the enemy’s territory, of all that gives life to his aerial forces.”230  
Attacking the civilian population centers directly would, in Douhet’s view, shatter the 
morale of the enemy and bring the war to a decisive end.231  Thus, air power would 
succeed where land power and sea power had failed by directly attacking a country’s 
capacity to conduct war. 
 Douhet was a strong advocate of the offense, and he believed his enemies were as 
well. Consequently, he assumed as fact that other countries would prioritize their 
development of offensive aerial capabilities in the same manner he had. Because he also 
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dismissed the possibility of any effective defense against aerial attack, Douhet concluded 
that “there is no practical way to prevent the enemy from attacking us with his air force 
except to destroy his air power before he has a chance to strike at us.”232 In order to 
accomplish this, Douhet said, one must attain “command of the air.”233  Analogous to 
Mahan’s command of the sea, in which the enemy was denied freedom of navigation 
upon the seas by the destruction of his naval fleet, so did Douhet’s idea of command of 
the air entail the destruction of the enemy’s aerial capacity.  “Conquering the command 
of the air implies positive action—that is, offensive and not defensive action, the very 
action best suited to air power.”234  
 Anticipating the objections to his theory, Douhet acknowledged that the accuracy 
of bombers could not match that of ground artillery. He countered that such a level of 
accuracy for a bomber was unnecessary, because the targets of a bombing raid would be 
unable to withstand the explosions. Furthermore, bombs needed only to fall on their 
targets to have the desired effect and would, therefore, require less steel and precision 
work to manufacture. Consequently, not only would bombs weigh less and carry larger 
charges relative to artillery shells, bombers could carry large numbers of them.235  So 
long as the objective was completely destroyed in only one bombing action, Douhet 
argued that any large target in enemy territory was fair game. Possible targets of bombing 
raids could be “…peacetime industrial and commercial establishments; important 
buildings, private and public; transportation arteries and centers; and certain designated 
areas of civilian population as well.”236   
 The urgency which Douhet placed upon command of the air cannot be overstated. 
He asserted: 
To conquer the command of the air means victory; to be beaten in the air 
means defeat and acceptance of whatever terms the enemy may be pleased 
to impose. … From this axiom we come immediately to this first 
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corollary: In order to assure an adequate national defense, it is necessary 
- and sufficient—to be in a position in case of war to conquer the 
command of the air. And from that we arrive at this second corollary: All 
that a nation does to assure her own defense should have as its aim 
procuring for herself those means which, in case of war, are most effective 
for the conquest of command of the air.”237 
Since neither the army, nor the navy, could defend against aerial attack or strike deep 
enough into enemy territory to wipe out its aerial capability (preferably while it was still 
on the ground), Douhet reasoned that command of the air could only be achieved by a 
formidable aerial force. By transitive logic, he concluded that an aerial capability was, 
ultimately, the only way to ensure an adequate national defense. 
 However, Douhet’s notion of adequacy did not sit well with the entrenched 
interests of the Italian army and navy. Both the army and navy had employed auxiliary air 
forces in support of their operations during World War I, yet Douhet argued that auxiliary 
aviation was basically “…worthless, superfluous, [and] harmful.”238 Out of political 
expediency, Douhet decided in 1921 to cede the issue of auxiliary aviation to the army 
and navy, so long as both services included it in their budgets and placed it entirely under 
their direct commands.239 Betting that the services would either balk at having to pay for 
a well-organized air force out of their own budgets, or would fail to dedicate enough 
attention and study to aerial warfare, Douhet openly advocated in 1926 for the creation of 
an “Independent Air Force.”240 In his estimation, creating an entirely separate aerial 
branch of service would remedy the shortcomings of the auxiliary air force, which was, 
“Worthless because [it is] incapable of taking action if it does not have command of the 
air. Superfluous because a part of the Independent Air Force can be used as an auxiliary if 
the command of the air has been conquered. Harmful because it diverts power from its 
essential purpose, thus making it more difficult to achieve that purpose.”241  
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 By Douhet’s own admission, the meaning of “command of the air” could be 
confused with similar ideas, such as “preponderance” or “supremacy” in the air.242 
However, the distinction between the terms was critical for Douhet, because each 
suggested a different operational relationship to the enemy.  “Whoever possesses 
preponderance or supremacy in the air, “ he explained, “will be able to conquer the 
command of the air more easily; but until he has conquered it he does not possess it and 
he cannot make use of it.”243 Put another way, command of the air denotes “that state of 
affairs in which we find ourselves able to fly in the face of an enemy who is unable to do 
likewise.”244 
 An Independent Air Force, Douhet argued, needed to satisfy two conditions. One, 
it needed to possess enough strength to gain command of the air. Two, it needed to 
maintain its strength after gaining command of the air and “exploit it in such a way as to 
crush the material and moral resistance of the enemy.”245  The former condition, Douhet 
said, was “essential,” while the latter was “integral.”246 Depending on which condition 
described the state of affairs in one’s air force, the relative strategic advantage over the 
enemy could then be ascertained. As Douhet explained these two conditions: 
(1) an Independent Air Force which succeeds in conquering the command 
of the air, but does not keep up its strength and use it to crush the 
resistance of the enemy, will nevertheless be able to carry out actions very 
effective in the achievement of victory; and (2) an Independent Air Force 
which conquers the command of the air and keeps up enough strength to 
crush the resistance of the enemy will be able to achieve victory regardless 
of what happens on the surface.247 
This axiomatic assertion left no doubt in Douhet’s belief that future wars could be won 
by air power alone, and justifies his emphasis on creating an aerial branch that was 
administered independently of the army and navy. 
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 Ultimately, Douhet saw aviation as the central feature of future warfare. While his 
theories on air power might have been construed as the fanciful thinking of someone 
enamored with new technology, Douhet’s concern over the future of war ran deeper. The 
experience of World War I confirmed what many naysayers had predicted beforehand; 
namely that war was impossible, or that it had become so costly to wage, as to be 
impractical. The impossibility of war, however, had been considered only within the 
context of land and sea operations. The airplane, Douhet argued, added a third dimension 
to the battlefield, thus making war possible again. Critical to this new form of warfare, 
however, was achieving command of the air, because whoever possessed it would emerge 
victorious in war. The key to exploiting command of the air would entail massive 
bombing campaigns against the enemy’s civilian population. Doing so, Douhet believed, 
would destroy the morale of the people and quickly force a political decision. In the end, 
however, only an independent aerial branch of the service could build and maintain such 



















 William “Billy” Mitchell was born in 1879, in France, but grew up in his father’s 
home state of Wisconsin. At the age of eighteen, Mitchell enlisted in the First Wisconsin 
Infantry and served under General MacArthur during the Philippine insurrection.248  
Upon returning home from the war, Mitchell was commissioned as an officer in the U.S. 
Signal Corps and became an instructor at the U.S. Army Staff College at Fort 
Leavenworth in 1904. As an Army major, Mitchell travelled to Spain in 1917, after the 
United States decided to enter World War I. Mitchell immediately joined French General 
Philippe Pétain at the front and became the first Allied officer to fly over German lines. 
By September of 1918, he had been promoted to brigadier general and placed in charge 
of all American air combat units in France.249 Had the war continued beyond 1919, 
Mitchell would have been placed in command of all Allied air forces.250 
 After World War I ended, Mitchell reverted from his wartime rank to colonel, and 
was appointed Assistant Chief of the Air Service in 1921. Like his contemporary Giulio 
Douhet, Mitchell believed that the airplane would play a central role in the conduct of 
future war. Consequently, Mitchell pushed U.S. civilian leadership to form an 
independent aerial branch of the service. Over the next few years, Mitchell actively 
promoted aviation in both the public and private sector, yet the U.S. War and Navy 
Department continued to resist, particularly over his advocacy of using airplanes to sink 
any naval vessel. Tensions boiled over in 1925, when, after a series of fatal aviation 
mishaps, Mitchell publicly accused senior Army and Navy leaders of incompetence and 
borderline treason for failing to properly administer national defense.251  At the direct 
order of President Coolidge, court-martial proceeding against Mitchell began in 
November 1925. Seven weeks later, Mitchell was convicted and sentenced to a five year 
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suspension from active duty without pay. Although President Coolidge amended the 
sentence to half-pay, Mitchell chose to retire in February of 1926.252 
 Mitchell continued to promote and write about air power, though his most famous 
and comprehensive work, Winged Defense, was actually published the year prior to his 
retirement. However, because of the publicity surrounding Mitchell’s court-martial, 
Winged Defense received little attention in 1925. Despite his hopes to return to an official 
position in the U.S. Government, Mitchell was never offered the opportunity. He passed 
away from natural causes on February 29, 1936.253    
 “The world,” Mitchell declared, “stands on the threshold of the ‘aeronautical era.’ 
During this epoch the destinies of all people will be controlled through the air.”254 With 
this declaration, Mitchell expressed his core belief that the rise of air power would follow 
a similar path as that of land and sea power. Just as armies and navies had consolidated 
power and secured lines of communication within their respective domains, so would an 
air force be necessary to secure future freedom of movement throughout the atmosphere. 
While Mitchell acknowledged and respected the army and navy as the “older services,” 
he expressed frustration at the resistance he had encountered from both, concerning the 
development of aviation. As he noted: 
In the future, no nation can call itself great unless its air power is properly 
organized and provided for, because air power, both from a military and 
economic standpoint, will not only dominate the land but the sea as well. 
Air power in the future will be a determining factor in international 
competitions, both military and civil.255  
This was not to say that the army and navy were no longer relevant. Rather, Mitchell’s 
intent was to prioritize the development of air power over the other services. 
In much the same way that A.T. Mahan promoted sea power, Mitchell argued that 
air power was essential to the military and economic welfare of the nation. 
Comparatively, however, air power provided greater mobility. As Mitchell explained: 
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Air power is the ability to do something in or through the air, and, as the 
air covers the whole world, aircraft are able to go anywhere on the planet. 
… The whole country now becomes a frontier and, in case of war, one 
place is just as exposed to attack as another place. … Not only is this the 
case on land, it is even more the case on the water, because on the water 
no object can be concealed unless it dives beneath the surface.256   
Mitchell also suggested that air forces could conduct an “aerial siege” by sinking naval 
vessels and merchant ships of an enemy country, much in the same manner as Mahan 
might have proposed a naval blockade. For attacking the interior of a country, aircraft 
could fly over coastal and land defenses, subsequently striking the cities which 
manufactured the tools and ammunition for war-making. The greatest value of aerial 
attacks, he said, stems from their ability to “deprive armies, air forces, and navies even, 
of their means of maintenance.”257  
 Of course, the country being attacked would presumably have defenses against an 
aerial bombardment. At the time Mitchell wrote Winged Defense, no ground-based 
system had yet been developed that could effectively defend against an air attack. He 
concluded that “the only defense against aircraft are other aircraft which will contest the 
supremacy of the air by air battles. Great contests for control of the air will be the rule of 
the future.”258 Mitchell’s logic was that a defending country would be forced to 
concentrate its aircraft in order to counter an attacking bomber force. The attackers would 
respond in kind, resulting in a “succession of great air battles.”259 After a country’s air 
force is defeated, it would be unable to defend the infrastructure necessary to build and 
maintain its aerial capability. Air bases, hangars, training facilities, and grounded aircraft 
would be easily destroyed by the attackers, thereby preventing the defender from re-
building its aerial capability.260   
Regarding the United States, Mitchell believed that an “efficient air force … 
would be able to protect the country from invasion and would insure its 
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independence.”261 His assessment was based upon geographical calculation, yet he was 
concerned with establishing the ability of U.S. air forces to project air power against a 
hostile nation, without leaving itself vulnerable in the process. Mitchell asserted that air 
power would “dominate all sea areas when [aircraft] act from land bases and that no 
seacraft, whether carrying aircraft or not, [could] contest their aerial supremacy.”262 The 
best strategy, therefore, would be to establish forward bases on island chains from which 
to launch attacks against enemy territories or naval vessels.  “An island, instead of being 
easily starved out, taken or destroyed by navies as was the case in the past, becomes 
tremendously strong,” he concluded, “because it cannot be gotten at by any land forces, 
and while supremacy of the air is maintained, cannot be taken by sea forces.”263  
 As for its economic and commercial benefits, aviation showed much promise. In 
the 1920s, the plane had yet to demonstrate lower operating costs than the railroad or 
steamer. To make the airplane cost effective, Mitchell pushed for U.S. Government 
subsidies to develop commercial aviation. Using the European development model, he 
proposed that the government assist new commercial aviation ventures with 
approximately half the start-up costs of aircraft and equipment. The new companies 
would, in turn, agree to government regulation, but continue to receive subsidies and a 
guaranteed income for maintaining a certain number of pilots and mechanics. The benefit 
to the government from this system is that it develops commercial aviation, which, in 
turn, trains skilled aircrews and maintains equipment “at only about half of the cost that 
the Government would have to pay if it maintained them all itself.”264 Although no 
formal aviation system had been developed yet, Mitchell foresaw the creation of 
passenger airlines, freight carriers, and postal aviation through government 
investment.265  Here, Mitchell delineated the role of government in developing air power: 
The underlying motive in these services is military and the commercial 
part of it is entirely secondary. Great nations, however, seeing the coming 
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of air transportation in the future and knowing its potentialities, are laying 
plans for monopolizing this means of transportation in the future. … 
Government really is the only agency in our country that could do a thing 
of this kind as it involves a great deal of expense and investigation. If such 
a system were adopted, there is no question but that the United States 
would soon lead in commercial aviation.266 
As Mitchell saw it, the costs of aviation would decrease over time, eventually making it 
competitive with other modes of transportation and, consequently, sustainable.  “The 
substantial and continual development of air power,” he concluded, “should be based on 
a sound commercial aviation.”267 
 Eventually, the growth in air power led to a change in the equities between the 
army, navy, and aerial forces with regard to national defense. In the case of the navy, 
Mitchell was eager to get rid of the battleship as the bulwark of sea power, though he also 
dismissed the utility of the aircraft carrier, some naval bases and dockyards, and many 
ground coastal defenses.268 His rationale was that the submarine would eventually 
dominate surface vessels, with aircraft fully capable of providing an extra layer of 
defense.269 In the case of the army, Mitchell saw air power as having less drastic 
consequences. He predicted that armies would serve in a mostly defensive capacity, 
particularly in the U.S. Any hostile invader, Mitchell noted, would have to transport 
massive amounts of troops across the ocean. He did not see this as a likely event, and 
concluded that the best use for the army would be to “hold the land bases from which air 
forces or sea forces act.”270 
 Within the air force organization itself, Mitchell proposed three main branches: 
pursuit, bombardment, and attack. The first branch, pursuit, is the “main fighting line of 
an air force.”271 The main objective of pursuit, he said, is to establish control of the air by 
destroying the enemy’s pursuit capability. Mitchell warned that failure to accomplish this 
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objective would cause everything else to fail, as control of the air would be lost.272 The 
second branch of the air force is bombardment aviation. Mitchell described this branch as 
“designed to destroy objects on the ground or water by hitting them with projectiles, or 
covering them with chemicals.”273  These aircraft carried the largest and most powerful 
ordnance available, including torpedoes, and were escorted by pursuit aircraft. The third 
branch, attack, is “designed to act close to the ground and to destroy ships on the seas or 
on canals, railroad trains, motors, convoys or anything of that nature. It attacks from two 
or three hundred feet altitude and utilizes features on the ground … to conceal its 
movement.”274 Altogether, these three branches contain the offensive and defensive 
capabilities required for an air force to achieve control or supremacy of the air. 
 In his conclusions, Mitchell wrote that, “The influence of air power on the ability 
of one nation to impress its will on another in an armed contest will be decisive.”275  Air 
power, as he defined it, was an expression of economics and prestige, but also one of 
mobility and firepower. Developments in airpower, Mitchell argued, had made many 
concepts in the navy, such as battleships and coastal defenses, obsolete. The role of the 
army, he said, would mostly remain unchanged, except that there would be an 
incorporation of aviation firepower in support to the infantry. On a strategic level, 
however, Mitchell warned that all the other developed countries around the world were 
“organizing their air power for striking their adversaries as far away from their own 
countries as possible, whether the enemy be in the air, on the water, or on the land.”276  
Mitchell was adamant that no ground-based defenses could effectively counter air raids. 
The only adequate defense, he argued, was in “hitting the enemy first, just as far away 
from home as possible.”277   
  
  
                                                 
272 Mitchell, Winged Defense, 164. 
273 Ibid. 
274 Ibid. 
275 Ibid., 214. 
276 Ibid., 216. 
277 Ibid., 213. 
 81 
Analysis 
Douhet and Mitchell were probably more alike than they were different regarding 
their views on air power. Both men were veterans of World War I, and both encountered 
institutional resistance from their respective army and navy establishments, though one 
might argue that Douhet was punished more harshly than Mitchell. Both argued for the 
creation of a separate branch or arm of the service for the aerial forces, and both agreed 
that the roles of the army and navy had fundamentally changed with the advent of air 
power. From a tactical perspective, Douhet and Mitchell agreed that the airplane’s main 
strength was its ability to travel in three-dimensional space, enabling it to reach its 
objective without having to fight through the enemy’s army or navy first. From a 
strategic perspective, both saw the value in creating a fleet of bombers that could cause 
significant damage to the interior of a country. Most certainly, both saw the airplane as 
the future of warfare. 
The key difference between the two is that Douhet viewed the airplane primarily 
through the lens of military necessity, whereas Mitchell viewed the airplane in the 
broader context of air power. Douhet argued that “command of the air” should be the 
primary goal of any military strategy, because attaining it was both a necessary and 
sufficient condition for victory. Having command of the air allowed a country’s air forces 
to conduct strategic bombing campaigns against the enemy’s population centers, thereby 
crushing morale. In Douhet’s assessment, such bombing raids were enough to destroy the 
enemy’s will and means to resist. For that reason, he argued, military spending should be 
weighted heavily in favor of the air forces. 
Mitchell, on the other hand, took a more nuanced view. The economic and 
military interests in aviation, he argued, were closely intertwined. Although he defined 
air power in terms of mobility, Mitchell’s detailed plan to link commercial and military 
aviation interests together suggest that his definition, as stated, might have been too 
narrow. Recognizing that aviation would continue to expand into worldwide commercial 
interests and military relations, Mitchell’s grand strategy was to have government partner 
with private industry in order to grow a sustainable aviation capability in the United 
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States. The symbiotic relationship between military, government, and commercial 
aviation would not only ensure its survival in the U.S., but its dominance as well.   
However, while the partnership between commercial and government interests 
ensured the survival of aviation as an institution, it said nothing of how aviation should 
be employed to achieve military objectives. Mitchell certainly had a strong interest in the 
development of faster and deadlier airplanes, yet his concern seemed to focus more on 
the tactical considerations. The reverence that he bestowed upon the pursuit branch of the 
air force suggests that he saw the great battle in the sky as the decisive event of the air 
campaign. Unlike Douhet, who saw the bomber bringing terror to the civilian populations 
in enemy lands as the decisive point of war, Mitchell highlighted several other roles for 
military aircraft such as their ability to sink naval vessels, or to occupy island chains in 
order to establish defensive perimeters outside the mainland. Put another way, air power 
could be used to support land or naval operations, or it could be employed autonomously 
to achieve different ends, yet Mitchell would not say that air power was a sufficient 
condition for victory.  “Victory,” he said, “always comes to that country which has made 
proper estimate of the equipment and methods that can be used in modern ways.”278   
By contrast, Douhet’s viewed air power from a singularly offensive mindset. For 
Douhet, command of the air was an all-or-nothing proposition. The existence of any 
aerial resistance to the attacking air force meant that command of the air did not exist. If 
airspace was contested to any degree, the attacker might be said to have supremacy or 
control of the air, but not command. Douhet certainly allowed for aircraft to support army 
and navy operations in his writings, yet placing aircraft in a supporting role might only 
increase the probability of success, rather than guarantee it. The primary objective of 
one’s own air force, he argued, is to destroy the enemy’s air force, whether on the ground 
or in the air. Within the context of post-WWI Europe, Douhet’s almost singular focus on 
the military aspects of aviation is understandable. Though he did not ignore the 
governmental or commercial aspects of aviation, Douhet could not have failed to see the 
possibility of another major war breaking out in Europe, and he was convinced aviation 
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would play a major role. Perhaps this was the reason he felt so compelled to discuss a 
theory of warfare in Command of the Air. 
 As future events would show, some of the predictions and theories of both men 
would turn out to be wrong. For instance, implementing Mitchell’s recommendation to 
scrap the aircraft carrier from the navy would have proven disastrous to the U.S. Pacific 
campaign during World War II, and the fire-bombing campaigns of Dresden and Tokyo 
in that same war failed to cause the social upheaval that Douhet predicted would follow. 
Nevertheless, their theories were influential enough to inspire the strategic bombing 
school of thought that emerged from the experience of WWII, and though some of their 
prognostications turned out to be wrong, both correctly predicted the importance aviation 
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V. BRODIE VS. WOHLSTETTER 
Issue: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for successful nuclear 
deterrence? 
In August 1945, President Truman made the controversial decision to authorize 
dropping the atomic bomb on Japan. Whatever Truman’s rationale for deploying the 
bomb, it was clear that, in the aftermath, the world had entered a new paradigm of 
international relations that would be heavily influenced by the existence of these new and 
terrifying weapons. Given the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons, 
policy-makers and strategists at the time had little in the way of historical analogy with 
which to guide their analysis regarding both the role and use of this new technology in 
the post-World War II era.   
Central to the debate was the concept of nuclear deterrence. Given the destructive 
power of nuclear weapons, Bernard Brodie argued in The Absolute Weapon (1946) that 
deterrence is intrinsic to the possession of nuclear weapons, such that one needed only a 
few of them to achieve a deterrent effect. In effect, the destructive power of the bomb 
was so great as to make an arms race impractical. Thirteen years later in 1959, strategist 
Albert Wohlstetter disputed Brodie’s automatic deterrence theory, because it assumed 
mutual extinction was the only outcome of a nuclear exchange. Wohlstetter believed that 
a war using nuclear weapons was winnable, and, consequently, competing countries had 
an incentive to build more warheads.   
Admittedly, much has transpired since the mid-twentieth century regarding 
nuclear policy, deterrence thinking, and advancements in technology. It is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to cover all these aspects in one place, as such a task would be 
monumental. Indeed, even Brodie and Wohlstetter found it necessary to periodically 
update their own thinking on these topics over the course of decades. The purpose here, 
however, is to examine the basic logic of deterrence as it was understood by these two 
thinkers.   
Despite the vast library of writings from both authors on the topic of deterrence, 
this chapter will focus on their earliest ones. The reason for limiting analysis to these 
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early works is due to the nature of deterrence itself. In theory, deterrence relies on the 
existence of some level of uncertainty in order to be effective, and the period in which 
Brodie and Wohlstetter first wrote about deterrence was certainly characterized by great 
uncertainty. Thus, focusing on their earliest works is most likely to provide a genuine 




























 Born in Chicago, Illinois, in 1910, Bernard Brodie was the son of Jewish 
immigrants from Russia. He received his doctorate from the University of Chicago in 
1940, and subsequently taught at Dartmouth from 1941 to 1943. During World War II, 
Brodie served in the U.S. Naval Reserve Bureau of Ordnance and at the Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations.279  Following the war, Brodie taught international relations at 
Yale University from 1945 to 1951. From 1951 to 1966, Brodie served as a senior staff 
member at the RAND Corporation, where he advised and consulted the U.S. military 
services on national security matters, including nuclear strategy.280  After leaving the 
RAND Corporation, Brodie taught political science as a professor at the University of 
California at Los Angeles until his death in 1978. Brodie’s legacy consists of several 
books and articles on nuclear deterrence, although his two best-known works are The 
Absolute Weapon (1946) and Strategy in the Missile Age (1959).   
 In The Absolute Weapon, Brodie’s theoretical foundation of deterrence was best 
expressed in the following observation: “Men have in fact been converted to religion at 
the point of the sword, but the process generally required actual use of the sword against 
recalcitrant individuals. The atomic bomb does not lend itself to that kind of discriminate 
use.”281  From this observation, it is evident that Brodie’s framework of deterrence 
consisted on both psychological and technical components. In other words, the one doing 
the deterring needed to show capability and willingness to use a weapon, but in a 
measured manner. Brodie argued that the mere threat of retaliation with a relatively small 
number of atomic weapons represented both a necessary and sufficient condition for 
successful deterrence, and he proposed a set of six postulates to support his theory. What 
follows are Brodie’s postulates and the analysis of them. 
Postulate 1: “The power of the present bomb is such that any city in the world can 
be effectively destroyed by one to ten bombs.” 
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When Brodie wrote this in 1946, he referred to Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer’s 
recent assessment that the Nagasaki atomic bomb was powerful enough to completely 
destroy at least ten square miles. Brushing aside criticisms from the U.S. Army Air 
Forces that equivalent destruction could just as easily have been brought about by a few 
days’ worth of conventional bombing sorties, Brodie countered that the one bomber 
carrying one atomic bomb could achieve the same result as five hundred conventional 
bombers. By simple calculation, the five hundred or so bombers that would have been 
required to destroy Hiroshima with conventional munitions could have been individually 
armed with atomic bombs and destroyed five hundred cities of similar size. Even with the 
air forces available at the time, he argued, it was possible to “wipe out all the cities of a 
great nation in a single day.”282   
Postulate 2: “No adequate defense against the bomb exists, and the possibilities of 
its existence in the future are exceedingly remote.” 
Here, Brodie warned against placing too much faith in defensive measures or 
counterweapons against the bomb. Cities, he argued, are static targets (no armor and no 
maneuverability) with no ability to absorb the punishment of a nuclear onslaught. 
Thinking that there is, or will be, some sort of counterweapon or defense is, he declared, 
“the most dangerous kind of illusion.”  Furthermore, even if there was a way to reduce 
the number of bombs or missiles that find their target, such a countermeasure would not 
be sufficient enough to prevent the target’s destruction. Inevitably, advances in weapons 
technology would lead to improved delivery systems and more powerful bombs, possibly 
in greater numbers, thereby offsetting any gains in defensive measures.283   
Postulate 3: “The atomic bomb not only places an extraordinary military 
premium upon the development of new types of carriers but also greatly extends 
the destructive range of existing carriers.” 
Brodie began by examining the cost-effectiveness of rockets that might be 
outfitted with nuclear warheads. In 1946, the ICBM was still several years away, but 
despite the technological challenges at the time, Brodie argued that it was theoretically 
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possible to develop a rocket that could travel several thousands of miles. Criticism at the 
time might have focused on the challenges of accuracy, but Brodie dismisses this as 
inconsequential, since the destructive radius of an atomic blast is measure in miles, 
instead of yards.284 
 Although Brodie correctly foresaw the development of more powerful and 
accurate rockets, those advancements had not yet materialized. Consequently, he was 
more concerned with the immediate implications for strategic bombing capability. He 
argued that one successfully delivered atomic bomb was sufficient to make a bombing 
sortie profitable. This increased the effective range of existing bombers dramatically, due 
to the lighter payloads they would need to carry for each sortie. Although the weight of 
the atomic bomb was classified, he argued that it was, nevertheless, much lighter than the 
tonnage in conventional munitions that a B-29 would have to carry in order to make the 
sortie profitable. In effect, any world power would be able to deliver a nuclear strike from 
air bases within its own territory against most of the cities in any other country. The 
major implication for both the attacker and the defender was that distance could not 
provide immunity from an atomic bomb attack.285  At the time, Brodie did not discount 
the value of advanced air bases that put the U.S. military within closer striking distance 
of its adversaries. However, he disputed the notion that having them was an absolutely 
necessary condition for employing the atomic bomb. Over time, distance would become 
less of a factor. 
Postulate 4: “Superiority in air forces, though a more effective safeguard in itself 
than superiority in naval or land forces, nevertheless fails to guarantee security.” 
Brodie argued that this postulate would be self-evident once long-range rockets or 
missiles that could deliver a nuclear warhead from afar were developed. However, he 
limited the scope of this postulate to the capabilities of existing carriers, which were 
bombers. In particular, Brodie criticized the common notion that command of the air was 
a necessary, or even realistic, objective for the purpose of conducting warfare with 
atomic bombs. Command of the air, Brodie said, was frequently viewed in a similar 
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fashion as command of the sea. The former, he argued, suggests that the enemy is taking 
on more losses than he can tolerate, while the latter suggests uncontested domination. In 
the context of a nuclear strike delivered by bombers, where the acceptability of losses is 
qualitative, the number of planes shot down becomes irrelevant if enough planes get 
through.286  Inevitably, enough planes can, and will, break through, even if attacking 
forces are inferior. As evidenced by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, where the 
attacking forces were numerically inferior, the larger number of defenders did not 
guarantee command of the air. The sky is simply too big to control in the Douhetian 
sense.287  To mitigate the damage of a conventional bombing raid, Brodie argued, 
numbers of aircraft and a robust air defense system matter; against the atomic bomb, they 
do not. However, once long-range rockets were developed, the number of bombers would 
become much less relevant anyway.288 
Postulate 5: “Superiority in numbers of bombs is not in itself a guarantee of 
strategic superiority in atomic bomb warfare.” 
Based on the existing technology at the time, Brodie assumed that the primary 
targets for the atomic bomb would be cities. From an economy of force perspective, 
Brodie noted, “One does not shoot rabbits with elephant guns, especially if there are 
elephant available.”289  The destructive power of the bomb warranted use against any 
densely concentrated target; therefore cities would be the likely targets. The victor in 
such an exchange would be the one who could eliminate the cities of the enemy without 
similarly losing his own. Furthermore, only the big or important cities require targeting. 
Expending extra bombs to destroy more cities after a strategic decision has been gained 
rewards the attacker with rapidly diminishing returns. Because the number of truly 
critical targets is limited, Brodie argued, so too are the number of bombs required to win 
a strategic decision.290  
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Postulate 6: “Regardless of American decisions concerning retention of its 
present secrets, other powers besides Britain and Canada will possess the ability 
to produce the bombs in quantity within a period of five to ten years hence.” 
 Brodie correctly predicted the difficulties in getting the Soviet Union, or any 
country for that matter, to accept any international regulation of nuclear technology prior 
to producing an atomic bomb of equivalent power to those possessed by the United 
States. A State Department Board of Consultant’s report from March 1946 concurred 
with this sentiment when it acknowledged that any hope for international regulation of 
nuclear technology depended on the accelerated decline of the U.S. nuclear monopoly.291  
Major General Leslie Groves had recently asserted that it would take decades for the 
Russians to duplicate the U.S. feat of building the bomb, due to their lack of engineering 
and industrial acumen. However, Brodie predicted that the Soviet Union would develop a 
nuclear capability within a few short years. In response to Groves’ assessment that the 
Soviets would take a long time to acquire the bomb, Brodie suggested that such an 
assertion might only be true if the existence of the atomic bomb had been kept secret in 
the first place. Since all the major world powers had knowledge of the bomb after August 
1945, it was only a matter of time before the Soviets and others would acquire the 
technology necessary to build it. 
In sum, Brodie’s postulates advance an empirical argument concerning the 
inescapable result from a nuclear exchange. However, his theory of deterrence also 
addressed the unique psychology underlying the use of the atomic bomb. As Dr. 
Oppenheimer declared, the bomb “is a weapon for aggressors, and the elements of 
surprise and of terror are as intrinsic to it as are the fissionable nuclei.”292  Brodie treated 
Oppenheimer’s statement concerning the nature of the bomb as self-evident, and took the 
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“Brodie said, “will not need to fear retaliation. If it must fear retaliation, the fact that it 
destroys an opponent’s cities some hours or even days before its own are destroyed may 
avail it little.”293  
Brodie’s postulates demonstrated that there was no sufficient defense against an 
atomic bomb, as it would be impossible to harden or shield cities to any effective degree 
against the damage from a nuclear blast. Thus, he argued, the element of surprise in a 
nuclear exchange becomes less consequential, because the attacker knows he will be 
retaliated against. Brodie concluded, “… no victory, even if guaranteed in advance—
which it never is—would be worth the price. The threat of retaliation does not have to be 
100 percent certain; it is sufficient if there is a good chance of it, or if there is a belief that 
there is a good chance of it. The prediction is more important than fact.”294  Basically, a 
relatively small number of atomic bombs were sufficient for achieving a deterrent effect. 
Brodie concluded that nations would be deterred automatically from using nuclear 
weapons because the fear of retaliation would discourage aggression in the first place. 
Brodie recommended that, in the Atomic Age: 
the first and most vital step in any American security program … is to take 
measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of attack the possibility of 
retaliation in kind. The writer in making that statement is not for the 
moment concerned about who will win the next war in which atomic 
bombs are used. Thus, far the chief purpose of our military establishment 
has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert 
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ALBERT WOHLSTETTER 
 Born in New York in 1913, Albert Wohlstetter studied mathematics at the City 
College of New York and Columbia University. During WWII, he worked with the War 
Production Board at Atlas Aircraft Products Company.296 From 1951 to 1963, he served 
as a consultant and policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, where he researched and 
advised on U.S. nuclear strategy against the Soviets. During his time at RAND, 
Wolhstetter published “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” which appeared in a 1959 issue 
of Foreign Affairs and was perhaps his most influential work, due to its timing and policy 
implications. After leaving RAND, Wohlstetter taught political science at the University 
of Chicago until 1980, but continued to publish and conduct policy research throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s on topics such as proliferation, ballistic missile defense, and nuclear 
policy. He died in Los Angeles in 1997.297 
 Following the Soviet launch of Sputnik in October 1957, the United States 
increased research and development for its bomber and ballistic missile programs. 
Matching or exceeding Soviet capabilities became the priority following Sputnik, and led 
to an increased focus in math and sciences in American schools and a greater sense of 
national urgency to out-do the Russians. As a strategist and advisor to the U.S. 
Government at the time, Wohlstetter was troubled by what he viewed as a widespread 
conceptual misunderstanding of deterrence, in which the strategic utility of new 
technologies was measured by how well they exceeded or overwhelmed the Soviet 
nuclear first-strike capability.  “To deter an attack,” he clarified, “means being able to 
strike back in spite of it. It means, in other words, a capability to strike second.”298 This 
thinking represented a major shift for many political and military leaders who had 
previously accepted mutual destruction as the inevitable result of a nuclear exchange. 
Wohlstetter rejected this notion and said, simply, “Deterrence … is not automatic.”299 
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 Wohlstetter’s theory of deterrence rested on the idea of maintaining the delicate 
balance of terror. In the simplest sense, balance of terror was a state of affairs in which 
the U.S. and Soviet Union were both equally fearful that the other was capable of 
surviving a first-strike and delivering a counter-strike (second strike). He argued that a 
balance of terror was attained through the possession of an undeniable nuclear second-
strike capability by competing powers, although the threshold for what constituted 
“undeniable” was difficult to calculate, and Wohlstetter acknowledge as much. 
Nevertheless, the complexities involved and incompleteness of information due to the 
secrecy of the enemy clearly did not, in Wohlstetter’s mind, excuse military planners 
from conducting a rigorous quantitative analysis of both friendly and enemy nuclear 
capabilities.   
In general, Wohlstetter argued, a credible second-strike capability must possess 
the following qualities: 
(a) a stable, “steady-state” peacetime operation within feasible budgets 
(besides the logistic and operational costs that are, for example, problem 
of false alarms and accidents). They must have also the ability (b) to 
survive enemy attacks, (c) to make and communicate the decision to 
retaliate, (d) to reach enemy territory with fuel enough to complete their 
mission, (e) to penetrate enemy active defenses, that is fighters and 
surface-to-air missiles, and (f) to destroy the target in spite of any passive 
civil defense in the form of dispersal or protective construction or 
evacuation of the target itself.300 
Within the context of the time, Wohlstetter was primarily concerned with the Soviet 
Union as the main competitor of the U.S, though his argument was applicable to any 
totalitarian aggressor.”301 The comparative advantages that totalitarian regimes held were 
the ability to maintain surprise and secrecy concerning intentions and operations. This 
uncertainty made planning that much more difficult for open societies such as the U.S., 
and it was precisely this uncertainty that presented the greatest likelihood of 
miscalculation that could lead to thermonuclear war. Instrumental in reducing the chances 
for such a war, Wohlstetter argued, was for U.S. planners to understand the range of 
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alternatives and options open to the aggressor and adjust accordingly.  “It is important, 
“he said, “not to confuse our uncertainty with his. The fact that we may not know the 
accuracy and number of his missiles will not deter him.”302  
Although Wohlstetter warned that deterrence was not automatic and, hence, could 
fail, he did not intend to diminish the importance of strategic deterrence. Using the 
scenario of an old Western gun duel, Wohlstetter likened the psychological calculations 
of the two gunslingers to that of the U.S. and Soviet Union, in which each country had 
the opportunity to make a crippling first strike: 
It would be extraordinarily risky for one side not to attempt to destroy the 
other, or to delay doing so, since it not only can emerge unscathed by 
striking first but this is the sole way it can reasonably hope to emerge at 
all. Evidently, such a situation is extremely unstable. … A protected 
retaliatory capability has a stabilizing influence not only in deterring 
rational attack, but also in offering every inducement to both powers to 
reduce the chance of accidental war.303 
Hence, the balance of terror exists only when the aggressor believes he will suffer 
catastrophic damage if he initiates an attack. For this to be the case, the aggressor must be 
convinced that the defender can withstand the first strike. Put another way, the defender 
must be able to protect his retaliatory capability. Ultimately, the aggressor has a powerful 
motivation not to attack, even if it were possible for him to cause massive damage to his 
opponent.   
 In his final analysis, Wohstetter asked, “What can we say then, in sum, on the 
balance of terror theory of automatic deterrence? It is a contribution to the rhetoric rather 
than the logic of war in the thermonuclear age. In suggesting that a carefully planned 
surprise attack can be checkmated almost effortlessly, that in short we may resume our 
deep pre-Sputnik sleep, it is wrong and its nearly universal acceptance is terribly 
dangerous.”304 Deterrence, he argued, was achievable. However, deterrence could fail. 
Should it fail, he asserted, the U.S. would have to be prepared to weather the first strike, 
as well as be able to launch a counter-strike. Wohlstetter did entertain the idea of an air 
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defense shield that could protect against incoming warheads, but the technology for it did 
not exist at the time. Had it been available, Wohlstetter predicted both sides would 
possess shields, making deterrence difficult to achieve, since the risks to each would 
decrease to almost zero. Until such a shield could be built, however, the calculations 
would have to determine how many, not if, thermonuclear warheads would strike their 
targets. Regardless of who achieved victory, however, Wohlstetter acknowledged that the 
destruction inherent in any thermonuclear exchange would be devastating.305  
 Ultimatley, Wohlstetter’s theory of deterrence dismissed the idea of a few 
warheads as an adequate safeguard against a nuclear attack. While he believed in the 
necessity of deterrence, Wohlstetter was very concerned about the consequences should it 
fail, or if there were an accidental launch.  “A deterrent strategy, he said, “is aimed at a 
rational enemy. Without a deterrent, general war is likely. With it, however, war might 
still occur. This is one reason deterrence is only a part and not the whole of a military and 
foreign policy.”306 He recommended various safeguards, such as early warning systems 
and “fail-safe” measures, in order to give decision-makers extra time to assess the 
situation before committing to thermonuclear war and reduce the chance of 
miscalculation. However, Wohlstetter argued that such measures could never reduce the 
chance of miscalculation to zero. Furthermore, he asserted, any arms inspection treaties 
or limitation efforts could reduce, but never eliminate, the possibility of a surprise nuclear 
attack.307  
A common argument at the time was that a reduction in tension between the U.S. 
and the Soviets should be the primary foreign policy goal. Wohlstetter argued that while 
less tension was a good thing, emphasizing it missed a more important point: 
Almost everyone seems concerned with the need to relax tension. 
However, relaxation of tension, which everyone thinks is good, is not 
easily distinguished from relaxing one’s guard, which almost everyone 
thinks is bad. Relaxation … is not an end in itself. Not all danger comes 
from tension. The reverse relation, to be tense where there is danger, is 
                                                 
305 Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” part VI (accessed October 12, 2012). 
306 Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” part VII (accessed October 12, 2012). 
307 Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” part VII (accessed October 12, 2012). 
 97 
only rational. If there is to be any prospect of realistic and useful 
agreement, we must reject the theory of automatic deterrence.308 
No matter the results of negotiations and treaties, he argued, there would always be the 
temptation to hide nuclear weapons in reserve, because inspections and reconnaissance 
could never catch all of them. Consequently, even if the U.S. and the Soviets were to 
agree to completely disarm, there would be no way to guarantee compliance. Should the 
U.S. disarm, it would leave itself dangerously exposed in the event of an unlimited war 
fought with conventional forces, since even a small number of Soviet thermonuclear 
weapons would be enough for it to achieve victory.   
 Presumably, the Soviets were employing a similar logic, but Wohlstetter thought 
it too dangerous to leave the issue to chance. He acknowledged that conventional military 
forces might even succeed in deterring the outbreak of general war. However, the 
military would do little to “remove the danger of accidental outbreak or limit the damage 
in case deterrence failed, nor would it be at all adequate for crises on the periphery.”309 
Any chance of reducing the chance for nuclear war, he concluded, would require an 
adjustment of foreign policy. Nevertheless, the risks of a nuclear war breaking out could 
only be mitigated, but never eliminated. A launch might be deliberate or accidental, yet 
the reasons for the launch would be irrelevant in light of the aftermath. Wohlstetter 
encouraged greater controls and safeguards for nuclear weapons in order to reduce the 
chances for miscalculation or accidents, yet he argued that the possibility of nuclear war 
could not be reduced to zero. Thus, the ability to strike back in case of a nuclear attack 
was absolutely essential to achieving a deterrent effect, not just to dissuade the enemy 






                                                 
308 Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” part VII (accessed October 12, 2012). 
309 Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” part VIII (accessed October 12, 2012). 
 98 
Analysis 
 In 1959, thirteen years after publishing The Absolute Weapon, Brodie published 
Strategy in the Missile Age, in which he discussed his framework of deterrence in the 
context of advanced technologies, particularly the ballistic missile. In Strategy, Brodie 
echoed several recommendations that Wohlstetter had advanced, particularly the 
requirement for a protected second-strike capability. Such analysis was timely, of course, 
since the Cuban Missile Crisis three years later would highlight the need for further 
safeguards and procedures. However, the fundamental debate between Brodie and 
Wohlstetter remained; namely, whether or not automatic deterrence was a valid concept. 
 The challenge in assessing the debate, even with the last fifty years to provide 
data points, is the difficulty in proving successful deterrence. One could easily argue that 
deterrence has thus far succeeded because there have been no nuclear wars. Certainly, 
one would be hard-pressed to argue that deterrence has failed. Whether it was Brodie or 
Wohlstetter who was correct will never be known for certain. However, if deterrence has 
been successful, then it raises the question as to why. Using Brodie’s argument, the 
answer would be that each side maintained just enough bombs to penetrate the other’s 
defenses and cause enough pain so as to discourage a first strike. Thus, deterrence was 
automatic. Using Wohlstetter’s argument, Brodie’s thinking was dangerous, because 
accidental launches might happen. Furthermore, Wohlstetter was not as convinced that 
the Soviets would calculate the risks of a nuclear exchange in the same manner as the 
U.S. At a minimum, he was not convinced that a nuclear exchange would necessarily 
lead to mutual extinction. Russia, Wohlstetter noted, suffered over twenty million 
casualties in WWII, yet recovered quite well from that catastrophe.310 Therefore, efforts 
to harden cities and protect infrastructure from nuclear attack mattered considerably, 
according to Wohlstetter.   Such measures, Wohlstetter said, “might mean, for example, 
the difference between fifty million survivors and a hundred and twenty million 
survivors, and it would be quite wrong to dismiss this as an unimportant difference.”311 
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Both Brodie and Wohlstetter made the foundational assumption that the Soviets 
would definitely launch a nuclear strike, had they not feared some sort of counterstrike. 
This assumption was critical because it may very well have been the case that the Soviets 
had no intention to launch a first strike, even if they could have done so without the fear 
of nuclear retaliation. Nevertheless, the debate between Brodie and Wohlstetter assumed 
deterrence was the governing factor in the decision to launch nuclear weapons. However, 
whether ten warheads or ten thousand warheads were sufficient enough to deter the 
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VI. GIAP VS. GALULA 
Issue: Can conventional forces defeat insurgencies and, if so, how? 
This chapter will discuss insurgency warfare. While the debate over the entire 
history of insurgencies demands a research project in its own right, this chapter will 
narrow the scope to “wars of national liberation” or “People’s Wars,” as they came to be 
called during the anti-colonialist period of the mid-twentieth century. The topics that will 
be explored in this debate concern the strategic utility of insurgency warfare and its 
countermeasures. For this thesis, guerrillas and partisans are synonymous with 
insurgents. Similarly, guerrilla warfare, revolutionary warfare, insurgency warfare, and 
partisan warfare are synonymous with each other.   
 Revolutionary warfare using guerrilla tactics had come to characterize many of 
the world’s conflicts in the anti-Colonial period following the end of WWII, particularly 
the struggle for control in French Indochina and, later, Vietnam. However, guerrilla 
tactics were not unique to the anti-colonial uprisings in the mid-twentieth century. 
Indeed, the etymological origin of the word guerrilla (small war) traces back to the 
operations that partisans undertook to drive Napoleon’s armies out of Spain in early 
1800s, yet the tactics by any name are as old as military history. In On Guerrilla Warfare 
(1937), Mao Tse-Tung wrote, “Though the strategy of guerrillas is inseparable from war 
strategy as a whole, the actual conduct of these hostilities differs from the conduct of 
orthodox operations.”312 By this statement, Mao implied that guerrilla warfare is not a 
strategy unto itself. Rather, it is method of fighting that is preferable to conventional 
warfare under certain conditions. The distinguishing characteristic of guerrilla warfare, 
Mao said, is that “there is in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a decisive battle; there is 
nothing comparable to the fixed passive defense that characterizes orthodox war.”313  
People’s Army of Vietnam (PAV) commander General Vo Nguyên Giap was 
schooled in guerrilla warfare and applied it extensively in Vietnam during its struggle 
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against the French and the Americans in the mid-twentieth century. Although history 
deems Giap victorious in both struggles, the debate remains as to whether the contest 
Vietnam was ever winnable by either the French or Americans. For that matter, much of 
the debate often concerns the definition of win or victory. In 1964, on the eve of 
America’s escalation in Vietnam, David Galula published On Counterinsurgency 
Warfare: Theory and Practice, in which he argued that fighting against guerrilla forces 
could done successfully, but would require a strategy different from that of conventional 
warfare. The timing of Galula’s book is ironic, as its release coincided with the U.S. 
foreign policy shift towards Vietnam following the Gulf of Tonkin. Though the history of 
Vietnam is now written, a comparison of Giap and Galula’s writings suggest how events 





















GENERAL VO NGUYÊN GIAP 
 Giap was born in 1912, in a poor area of central Vietnam. His formal education 
consisted of modern schooling, first at the French-run Lycée at Hué for high school, and 
later at Hanoi’s Lycée Albert-Sarraut, where he pursued undergraduate law studies. 
During his time at Hué, Giap joined his first underground revolutionary nationalist group 
in 1926, and later led student demonstrations against colonial authorities in the early 
1930s.314 He was briefly imprisoned for his activities at Hué, but was soon released. He 
earned his law degree in 1937 and his doctorate the following year, though he remained 
active in Communist politics.315  
 In 1939, Giap fled to southern China after France outlawed Communist parties at 
home and in its overseas possessions. Several members of Giap’s family who had stayed 
behind in Vietnam were arrested by French colonial authorities, tortured, and executed. 
Giap’s wife, who had also been arrested by the French authorities, later died in prison 
in1943. While exiled in China, Giap met Ho Chi Minh, who mentored him and tasked 
him to recruit and build a Communist military force in Vietnam. Giap returned to 
Vietnam in 1944 with his “Armed Propaganda Brigade for the Liberation of Vietnam” in 
order to attack French positions in the north, though he helped organize limited 
operations against occupying Japanese forces during that time as well.316  Upon the 
return of Indochina to French control, following the Japanese surrender in WWII, Giap 
spent the next few years mobilizing and leading the Viet Minh army to oust the French. 
The Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 effectively ended French control in 
Vietnam and solidified Giap’s role as de facto head of the People’s Army of Vietnam. By 
the time American advisors began arriving in force to Vietnam, Giap’s model of 
revolutionary warfare had already become an inspiration for other similar movements 
worldwide.   
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 In People’s War, People’s Army, Giap argued that the key factors that led to his 
decisive victory at Dien Bien Phu were having the correct policy and strategy. Giap first, 
and foremost, viewed the struggle inside Vietnam to be a war of national liberation, or 
revolutionary war. As a policy objective, national liberation meant that Giap’s army 
would have to first unite the people in common cause.317 Giap argued that the French 
colonials’ efforts to oppress those who were sympathetic to the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam violated the terms of the Preliminary Convention of 1946, and consequently de-
legitimized the government of the French Union.318 Although the Communist Party 
attempted to reconcile, their efforts towards peace were continually rebuffed by the 
French colonials in word and deed. As Giap explained, “Our Party’s policy of resistance 
was a precise one, in conformity with the masses’ requirements, whose wrath towards the 
aggressors had reached a climax. For this very reason … they were determined to wage 
the War of Resistance to final victory and annihilate the aggressors.”319  Giap also 
credited the final victory over the French to the Party’s steadfast adherence to the 
“national democratic revolution line.” 320 Keeping this singular objective always in the 
forefront of the peoples’ minds, Giap said, was a “nodal, decisive question” for the 
Party.321 Giap admitted that, without a unifying message, it never would have been 
possible to mobilize the population against the French colonials.  “In the political field, 
“ he said, “we had, at home, to increase the education and mobilization of the people … 
and endeavor to smash all the enemy’s schemes to divide and deceive our people, while 
in its foreign policy, efforts had to be made to win over support of the progressive people 
throughout the word … against this dirty war.”322  
 Resourcing a people’s war, Giap continued, required a re-tooling of the economy. 
The slogan for Vietnam, he pointed out, was “the whole nation in arms,” in which “each 
person was a soldier, each village a fortress, each Party branch and Resistance committee 
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a staff.”323 Accordingly, self-sufficiency was critical to prosecuting a people’s war, as 
most domestic production in a people’s war would be destined for soldiers fighting 
against the enemy. Such an economy would leave little to no production available for 
export or trade, and Giap acknowledged that a people’s war economy would require the 
population to endure long periods of hardship and deprivation. However, the working 
class peasant farmer comprised vast swaths of Vietnam’s countryside, and the personal 
sacrifices required by the Marxist-Leninist philosophy of the people’s war might have 
seemed no less oppressive than the policies of the colonials. The rural peasantry of the 
working class formed the backbone of the resistance and was critical to the strategy of 
guerrilla war that Giap’s army ultimately assumed.  “In waging the Resistance War,” he 
said, “we relied on the countryside to build our bases to launch guerilla warfare in order 
to encircle the enemy in the towns and eventually arrive at liberating the towns. 
Therefore, it was of particularly [sic] importance to pay due attention to the peasant 
question ... to step up the long Resistance War to victory.”324 
 Once the people were united in cause and effort, the Party had to settle on the 
proper mode of warfare. The “appropriate fighting principle” of the people’s army, Giap 
assessed, was one of “guerrilla warfare … advancing to mobile warfare.”325  This 
strategy was, however, very much a product of scarcity and necessity. As Giap noted, the 
enemy “…possessed a seasoned professional army equipped with up-to-date arms … and 
experienced in aggressive wars.”326 The Vietnamese resistance fighters, on the other 
hand, were initially untrained, disorganized, and insufficiently resourced. The key 
difference between the two sides, Giap argued, was that the colonial forces fought under 
an unjust cause, whereas the resistance fighters knew their own cause was just and had 
popular support. A people’s war of resistance would ultimately be victorious because 
time was in its favor. As Giap put it, “the enemy’s strong points were his weak ones and 
our strong points were his weak ones, but the enemy’s strong points were temporary 
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ones, while ours were basic ones.”327  Giap concluded that the enemy’s only viable 
strategy that stood a chance of success “was to attack swiftly and win swiftly. The more 
the war was protracted the lesser would be his strong points, and their weak points would 
grow weaker.”328 
 Giap saw it as axiomatic that the type of war he was fighting went through a 
defensive stage, and equilibrium stage, and, finally, an offensive stage. Much in the same 
way as Mao had outlined the flow of revolutionary war, Giap envisioned a gradual shift 
from guerrilla war to regular war as his forces gained strength and were subsequently 
able to shift from “partial entrenched camp warfare” to “mobile warfare.”329 Initially, 
Giap’s forces were too weak to engage large formations enemy head-on without risking 
their own annihilation. Yet, Giap also said that “the main goal of the fighting must be the 
destruction of enemy manpower, and ours should not be exhausted from trying to keep or 
occupy land.”330 Hence, Giap faced a dilemma between two competing imperatives: one 
was to conserve his own forces, while the other was to kill the enemy. The delicate 
balance between these two imperatives was to be found in his application of guerrilla 
warfare, in which autonomous companies of fighters would hide amongst sympathetic 
populations and strike at the enemy’s exposed supply lines, or when the opportunity 
presented itself to pick off relatively weak concentrations of enemy troops.   
 However, Giap’s use of guerrilla warfare was not the end of his overall campaign 
strategy. Rather, it was a means to transition into mobile warfare. As Giap noted: 
To keep itself in life and develop, guerilla warfare has necessarily to 
develop into mobile warfare. This is a general law. In the concrete 
conditions of our Resistance War, there could not be mobile warfare 
without guerilla warfare. But if guerilla warfare did not move to mobile 
warfare, not only the strategic task of annihilating the enemy manpower 
could not be carried out but even guerilla activities could not be 
maintained and extended.331 
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The decision to shift to mobile warfare as the primary mode of fighting was, nevertheless, 
an art. As Giap explained, mobile warfare maintained a guerilla character, but required a 
higher degree of centralization for execution.  “Mobile warfare,” he said, “is the fighting 
way of concentrated troops, of the regular army in which relatively big forces are 
regrouped and operating on a relatively vast battlefield, attacking the enemy where he is 
relatively exposed, … advancing very deeply then withdrawing very swiftly .”332 Giap 
emphasized that guerilla warfare should never disappear completely from the battlefield, 
even as the resistance war shifts to mobile warfare. As the ratio of regular troops to 
guerrillas increased, more coordination between the two was required. Even at the point 
in which mobile warfare became a more decisive effort than guerrilla war, the latter 
remained critical in keeping the enemy off balance in his rear echelons. The crux of his 
strategy that led to his culminating victory at Dien Bien Phu was simple: 
Throughout the Resistance War, while the enemy’s forces were more and 
more scattered, our strategic line was to extend the guerrilla warfare 
everywhere. … And parallel with the enemy’s dispersal of forces, our 
people’s revolutionary armed forces unceasingly intensified and extended 
guerilla activities, while without cease carrying on the work of 
concentration and building up regular units. In the fighting, in the course 
of the formation of our forces, we went gradually from independent 
companies operating separately to mobile battalions, then from battalions 
to regiments and divisions.333 
Giap argued that, by the time the French were working on the Navarre Plan in 1953, his 
own forces had the strength and mobility to rapidly concentrate forces on the enemy’s 
strategic points and defeat them.334  Ultimately, any victory over the Resistance army 
would have come at a cost far beyond what the French were, in Giap’s estimation, willing 
to bear. 
 In time and space, the PAV victory was characterized by the gradual expansion of 
interlocking “free zones” and “guerrilla areas” towards the North.335 This was, quite 
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simply, the physical manifestation of Giap’s strategy. As he evaluated the outcome of the 
war against the French colonials: 
The strategy of long-term war and the guiding principle of fighting from 
guerrilla war gradually moving to regular war with the forms of guerrilla 
warfare, mobile warfare including entrenched camp warfare, were very 
successful experiences of our national liberation war. These were the 
strategy and tactics of the people’s war, the art of military conduct of the 
people’s war, of the revolutionary war in a small and backward 
agricultural country under the leadership of our Party.336 
However, Giap remarked that the People’s Army of Vietnam following Dien Bien Phu 
resembled more of a modern army, and he predicted that any new war would be similarly 
modern. Yet, he also re-affirmed the commitment of the Vietnamese to conduct any 
future war as people’s war. As such, national defense would henceforth be a collective 
task of the people, with a formal militia playing a much greater role than it had prior to 
1954.337  Furthermore, Giap explained, the future armed forces in Vietnam would 
continue to involve local and paramilitary forces fighting alongside regular units. Perhaps 
foreshadowing the troubled U.S. foreign policy toward Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, 
Giap offered a simple observation: “The militia will always be a strategic force, and the 
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DAVID GALULA 
 David Galula was born in 1919, in French-occupied Tunisia. He obtained his 
baccalaureat at the Lycée in Casablanca, and later graduated from the Saint Cyr special 
military academy in 1939. During WWII, Galula saw combat action and was wounded at 
the invasion of Elba in June of 1944.339 Following WWII, Galula served as a military 
attaché to China and observed the rise of the Chinese Communist Party. Later, Galula 
studied the Indochina War, though he was not involved in the fighting. From 1956 to 
1958, Galula served as an infantry company commander in the French colonial forces 
during the Algerian War, where he effectively applied counterinsurgency tactics in his 
sector to eliminate the resistance. His outstanding performance in Algeria resulted in his 
accelerated promotion, and he was subsequently transferred to the National Defence 
Headquarters in Paris. Following several staff assignments, Galula resigned at the rank of 
lieutenant colonel, after which he took on a fellowship at Harvard University’s Center for 
International Affairs in 1962, and published Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 
Practice two years later. David Galula died from complications due to lung cancer in 
1967.340 
 Although Galula used the term “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency” 
extensively, he viewed these as “two different aspects of the same conflict.”341 Like Mao 
and Giap, Galula was concerned with the nature of revolutionary conflict and how 
opposing interests clash in this type of warfare. However, Galula emphasized that only 
the insurgent can initiate a revolutionary war. Counterinsurgency, on the other hand, is 
simply an effect of the insurgency and can only be defined in relation to the cause.342 
This, he said, differentiated counterinsurgency, or revolutionary, warfare from 
conventional warfare, in that either side could initiate hostilities in a conventional 
conflict. Furthermore, Galula argued, revolutionary conflict is, by definition, an internal 
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conflict. Although external powers almost invariably tend to involve themselves in the 
internal affairs of other countries, the key characteristic of revolutionary warfare is the 
existence of insurgent groups “challenging a local ruling power controlling the existing 
administration, police, and armed forces. In this respect, colonial revolutionary wars have 
not differed from purely indigenous ones, such as those in Cuba and South Vietnam.”343 
 Galula also differentiated between revolutionary warfare and revolution, in which 
the former represented a political condition, whereas the latter represented a 
comparatively discrete act. A revolution, he explained, is typically of short duration and 
spontaneous.  “It is an accident, which can be explained afterward, but not predicted 
other than to note the existence of a revolutionary situation,” he said.344  On the other 
hand, revolutionary warfare, like insurgency, is marked by “protracted struggle 
conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives 
leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order.”345 Therefore, revolutionary war is 
a political war, in which the population is the objective.346  
 The insurgent must gain the tacit support of the population if he is to be 
successful. Because the insurgent begins the war in a weaker military state than the 
counterinsurgent, “logic forces him instead to carry the fight to a different ground where 
he has a better chance to balance the physical odds against him.”347 Unlike conventional 
war in which politics assumes a secondary role to military operations, revolutionary war 
uses politics as the primary instrument of operations. Consequently, the counterinsurgent 
cannot afford to approach revolutionary war as he would a conventional war, in which 
military and political considerations are more “tidily separated.”348 Rather, “every 
military move has to be weighed with regard to its political effects, and vice versa.”349 
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 Additionally, as Giap had also argued, revolutionary warfare never becomes a 
fully conventional fight, even if the insurgent has succeeded in amassing a significant 
regular force. For one, the existence of a regular army does not preclude the need for 
guerrilla activities. In fact, such activities are needed to facilitate or enhance conventional 
operations.350 Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the insurgent has been embedded 
in the population since the beginning of the conflict and owes his success to its support of 
him. If the insurgent has “acquired the decisive advantage of a population organized and 
mobilized on his side…” and thus enjoys a freedom of movement that his enemy cannot, 
it makes little sense for the insurgent to abandon such an advantage.351 Key to the 
insurgent’s continued survival, Galula noted, is that “as long as the population remains 
under his control, the insurgent retains his liberty to refuse battle except on his own 
terms.”352   
At once, the insurgency has an inherent advantage. Success in conventional 
warfare is measured by the destruction of the enemy’s forces and the capture of his 
territories. Yet, the insurgent “holds no territory and refuses to fight for it.”353 Although 
Galula acknowledged that the counterinsurgent may occasionally isolate and destroy 
pockets of insurgent forces, such successes would be too rare to be of strategic 
significance. The insurgent advantage lies in his mobility and ability to hide amongst the 
populace, making his detection and capture difficult at best. Furthermore, even if 
counterinsurgent forces successfully captured or killed some guerrillas, the insurgent 
ranks would be quickly filled with new recruits. Ultimately, the counterinsurgent’s only 
hope for success using conventional operations would be to saturate the entire country for 
a sustained period of time. However, Galula argued, operations of this size and duration 
are extremely costly for the counterinsurgent, such that any victory would not be worth 
the price.354 
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 The counterinsurgent is equally precluded from employing insurgency warfare as 
its main strategy, Galula argued. For the counterinsurgent to adopt guerrilla tactics as the 
key strategy for destroying the insurgents would, in effect, represent a mismatch of 
capabilities and strengths. As Galula explained: 
For [the counterinsurgent] to adopt the insurgent’s warfare would be the 
same as for a giant to try to fit into a dwarf’s clothing. How, against 
whom, for instance, could he use his enemy’s tactics?  He alone offers 
targets for guerrilla operations. Were he to operate as a guerrilla, he would 
have to have the effective support of the population guaranteed by his own 
political organization among the masses; if so, then the insurgent would 
not have it and consequently could not exist; there would be no need for 
the counterinsurgent’s guerrilla operations.355 
The counterinsurgent could try increasing his clandestine capabilities as a 
countermeasure, though this, too, would eventually fail as a governing strategy. As 
Galula argued, clandestine forces have limited utility for the counterinsurgent, other than 
as a supporting asset, because the counterinsurgent’s “strength derives precisely from his 
physical open assets.”356 Furthermore, he noted, “experience shows that no rival—not to 
speak of hostile—clandestine movements can coexist for long; one is always absorbed by 
the other.”357  Despite the disadvantages, Galula did not intend to imply that insurgent 
tactics should never be used or attempted by the counterinsurgent. In fact, he argued, the 
use of “small commando-type operations” could support the larger effort, but “they 
cannot … represent the main form of the counterinsurgent’s warfare.”358 
 Ultimately, then, the counterinsurgent always faces a theoretical dilemma, 
because he cannot win using a purely conventional or insurgent strategy. Rather, some 
mix of the two approaches is necessary to defeat an insurgency. The correct blending of 
the two strategies is derived from “the inescapable conclusion … that the 
counterinsurgent must apply a warfare of his own that takes into account not only the 
nature and characteristics of the revolutionary war, but also the laws that are peculiar to 
                                                 





counterinsurgency and the principles deriving from them.”359 Galula four laws of 
counterinsurgency are as follows: 
• The First Law: The Support of the Population Is as Necessary for the 
Counterinsurgent as for the Insurgent. 360 
• The Second Law: Support Is Gained Through an Active Minority. 361 
• The Third Law: Support from the Population Is Conditional.362 
• The Fourth Law: Intensity of Efforts and Vastness of Means Are Essential.363 
The first law addresses the issue of keeping any given area that was previously 
under insurgent control clear of any recidivism. The only way to accomplish this goal, 
Galula argued, is to gain the support of the population. A population that is supportive of 
the counterinsurgent’s goals will be more likely to resist the insurgent’s attempts to re-
establish a foothold in a cleared area. Though the counterinsurgent will always be able to 
concentrate enough forces to destroy insurgents in any given area, the risk in doing so is 
that the insurgents can reappear in another less-contested spot. Thus, the counterinsurgent 
must have as his primary objective the population. Without the population’s support and 
cooperation, the counterinsurgent will never be able to prevent the insurgent from re-
taking lost ground.364 
Galula’s second law addresses the strategy used to defeat the political aims of the 
insurgent. In other words, it describes how to get the active, as well as passive, support of 
the population. The governing dynamic of politics, Galula argued, is that “in any 
situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral 
majority, and an active minority against the cause. The technique of power consists in 
relying on the favorable minority in order to rally the neutral majority and to neutralize or 
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eliminate the hostile minority.”365 The challenge for the counterinsurgent, therefore, is to 
correctly identify the favorable minority and mobilize it against the insurgent minority.   
The third law simply states that counterinsurgent must actively strive to maintain 
the trust and confidence of the populace once he has eliminated the insurgent. Key to 
maintaining this trust is sufficiently reducing the physical threat which insurgents or 
guerrilla forces can revisit upon the population. Thus, effective military and police 
actions must be executed by the counterinsurgent and observed by the population. 
Without security, the populace will be unreceptive to the political efforts of the 
counterinsurgent. Galula further observed that “the counterinsurgent needs a convincing 
success as early as possible in order to demonstrate that he has the will, the means, and 
the ability to win. The counterinsurgent cannot safely enter into negotiations except from 
a position of strength, or his potential supporters will flock to the insurgent side.”366  
The fourth law warns the counterinsurgent that the amount of effort he exerts will 
need to exceed that of his opponent every step of the way. Galula noted that the 
counterinsurgent, due to the nature of the war in which he fights, has the responsibility to 
maintain order in the face of his enemy, who is trying to cause disorder and de-legitimize 
him in kind. However, the ratio of counterinsurgent-to-insurgent expenditures is 
comparatively high, particularly at the outset of the conflict  
…when the insurgent reaches the initial stages of violence and resorts to 
terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The British calculated the cost of every 
rebel in Malaya at more than $200,000. In Algeria, the FLN budget at its 
peak amounted to $30 or $40 million a year, less than the French forces 
had to spend in two weeks. … Because of the disparity in cost and effort, 
the insurgent can thus accept a protracted war; the counterinsurgent should 
not.367 
By its nature, however, insurgency warfare is protracted. As Galula observed, “The 
operations needed to relieve the population from the insurgent’s threat and to convince it 
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that the counterinsurgent will ultimately win are necessarily of an intensive nature and of 
long duration. They require a large concentration of efforts, resources, and personnel.”368 
 The intent of Galula’s four laws of counterinsurgency warfare was to describe the 
nature of the conflict in which the counterinsurgent operates. From a prescriptive 
standpoint, Galula derived a set of principles from those laws that suggested a “step-by-
step” strategy for the counterinsurgent to follow in a given area of operations: 
1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of 
armed insurgents. 
2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent’s comeback in 
strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the 
population lives. 
3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut 
off its links with the guerrillas. 
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organizations. 
5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities. 
6. Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the 
softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize 
self-defense units. 
7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement. 
8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.369 
 
Galula acknowledged that this strategy might appear too rigid in certain cases, yet its 
logic is difficult to dispute, “because the laws … on which it is based can easily be 
recognized in everyday political life and in every recent revolutionary war.”370   
Taken in their entirety, the principles were designed to address the 
counterinsurgent’s worst-case scenario, which, as Galula described, meant operating in 
an area “where the insurgent is already in full control of the population.”371 In less severe 
circumstances, some of the steps may be skipped, while in relatively tame environments, 
most of the steps could be bypassed. However, Galula warned, these steps should not be 
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applied out of sequence, for doing so would “ [violate] the principles of 
counterinsurgency warfare and of plain common sense.”372 
At the time of his writing Counterinsurgency Warfare, Galula assessed that two 
major forces were driving insurgencies around the world. The first was neocolonialism, 
and the second was Communist pressure. The old colonial model, he said, was dead. Yet, 
the nationalist promise of economic development and progress was slow to materialize 
for the population in these former colonies, resulting in mass resentment and 
disillusionment.373 In the former colonies of Africa, Asia, and South America, the 
message of neocolonialist economic exploitation by Western powers would be the 
rallying cry of the Communists, who sought to check their opponent’s expansion. 
Sometimes, the anger at neocolonialism would be intense enough to foment an 
insurgency, largely without Communist assistance. In other times, the Communists would 
actively fan the flames of unrest. Regardless of degree, however, Communism would 
always play some part in driving insurgencies.374 
At its most fundamental level, Galula concluded, the strategy for 
counterinsurgency warfare could be expressed as: “Build (or rebuild) a political machine 
from the population upward.”375  Despite the simplicity of counterinsurgency strategy, 
however, not all counterinsurgencies are winnable. In Galula’s estimation, the contest 
between China’s Mao and Chiang Kai-Shek, Cuba’s Batista and Castro, and Algeria’s 
French colonials and the FLN, were winnable by either side, while the French 
counterinsurgency in Indochina was “doomed from the start.”376 Galula’s pessimism on 
the French chances of success in Indochina was likely due to an initial political 
environment that was so unfavorable for the French colonials, as to be insurmountable. 
As Galula noted, “When the insurgent’s cause is an all-or-nothing proposition, as in most 
anticolonial or Communist-led insurgencies, the margin for political maneuver is 
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extremely limited.”377  For the counterinsurgent to be decisively victorious, he must not 
only physically destroy the insurgent, but he must also maintain the permanent isolation 
of the insurgent by, and with, the active support of the population. Without the active 
support of the people, insurgents will simply reappear, either from external sources or by 
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Analysis 
By failing to isolate the insurgent from the population, the counterinsurgent must 
either give up the fight or continue to pour lives and money indefinitely into a protracted 
conflict. Both Giap and Galula arrived at this conclusion, and both understood that the 
material and monetary costs borne by the counterinsurgent are higher than insurgent’s. 
Additionally, each saw insurgency warfare, or revolutionary warfare, as political warfare. 
That is to say, the population itself is the primary objective of insurgency warfare. The 
debate between Galula and Giap would hardly seem to be a debate, as both viewed the 
French defeat in Indochina as inevitable. It may be said, however, that each man wrote 
for different purposes. Giap’s intent was to show why and how he had been successful in 
his own particular circumstances. Galula, on the other hand, wanted to develop a theory 
of counterinsurgency warfare in general. Put another way, Giap showed how to run an 
insurgency, while Galula showed how to defeat one. 
 While Giap’s victory at Dien Bien Phu made him somewhat of a folk hero to 
other would-be revolutionaries in the post-colonial period, it was not his goal to spread 
Communism around the world. Giap did not hide the fact that the organizational 
principles of Communism played a major role in revolutionary warfare, as he frequently 
referred to the “Party” during discussions concerning political strategy. However, his 
primary motivation was to expel an illegitimate occupation. As Giap acknowledged, the 
revolutionary army in Vietnam began as the militarily weaker side, and so was forced to 
use guerrilla warfare as its primary method of attacking the enemy at first. The ultimate 
victory over the French colonials was only possible because the PAV was able to build a 
conventional force large enough to attack the enemy head-on and win. Had the PAV been 
unable to grow its ranks of regular troops, it is questionable whether Giap would have 
succeeded in permanently driving out the French, at least in the near term. Without a 
decisive military victory, the struggle between the colonials and the revolutionary army 
would have turned into a protracted insurgency. If, as Giap asserted, the PAV was 
prepared to carry on a guerrilla war indefinitely, then it is unlikely that conventional 
forces could have ever defeated the insurgency. 
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Galula clearly believed that insurgencies could, in theory, be defeated, so long as 
the counterinsurgent, whether of conventional or unconventional background, focused its 
efforts on winning the population. While he acknowledged that the French defeat in 
Indochian was inevitable, Galula pointed to his experience in Algeria against the FLN as 
an example of successful counterinsurgency. However, Galula, like Giap, theorized about 
the viability counterinsurgency warfare in the historical and political contexts of 
Communism and post-colonialism. One might question, for instance, whether Galula’s 
fifth principle of holding elections is necessary for executing a successful 
counterinsurgency. One could easily argue that exerting fear and intimidation, or even 
brain-washing, is just as effective as instituting democratic mechanisms for achieving 
control over the populace.   
Yet, Galula was not wholly wedded to his principles of counterinsurgency so 
much as he was concerned about his four laws. Indeed, he argued that it would be 
difficult to refute his principles in light of recent experience, but he left open the 
possibility nonetheless. Much in the same way Clausewitz had once theorized about the 
general nature of war, with violence as the necessary component, so Galula theorized 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 Since the Napoleonic era, the study of strategy has been profoundly influenced by 
an uncharacteristically rapid pace of technological and social change. This is not to say 
that history before the eighteenth century lacks valuable lessons concerning politics and 
war. However, it is difficult to identify a time prior to that of Napoleon Bonaparte that 
can boast an equally explosive mix of nationalism, manpower, and firepower. When 
Clausewitz’s began writing On War, his deeply theoretical and esoteric inquiry into the 
nature of war was more than just the philosophical musings of an aging general. Rather, 
he recognized that changes in the social order of Europe and, hence, the way in which 
nations could mobilize their respective populations against one another were changing. It 
was under this pretense that this thesis affirmed the debate between Clausewitz and 
Jomini as a useful starting point from which to trace the evolution of strategic thought to 
modern times. 
 The scope of this thesis was limited to illuminating the strategic debates between 
various pairs of contemporaries, rather than assessing values of rightness or wrongness to 
each; such judgments would be appropriate for future research and analysis. In some 
cases, the level of disagreement was pronounced, while in others, such as the debate 
between Douhet and Mitchell, the differences are quite subtle. More often than not, the 
debaters were far from polarized on any given issue, though this was expected, given that 
the complexity of the subject matter being debated does not lend itself to simplistic or 
binary solutions. 
 While the choice of subject material for this thesis was heuristically driven, it may 
be said that its design reflects a longitudinal study of strategic thought over the past two 
centuries. The selection of debates for this study was based on mental models concerning 
the modality or dominant characteristic of the conduct of war at various periods in 
history, such as the “Age of Total War,” the “Industrial Age,” the “Age of Aviation,” the 
“Age of Steam,” the “Nuclear Age,” the “post-Colonial era,” etc. Accordingly, the author 
has examined how strategic thought evolved over time, using the debates themselves as 
data points. That said, when traced from the Napoleonic era to the present, the debates 
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suggest a deliberate process of tying strategic ends to means that are appropriate within a 
given historical context. When viewed in its entirety, the timeline from the Napoleonic 
era to the present generally shows a gradual escalation in the level of violence required to 
achieve the political objects of war, though the extremes to which governments were 
willing to go in order to achieve their aims arguably peaked with the development of 
thermonuclear weapons. As Clausewitz observed, the violence of war tends toward the 
maximum if left unchecked, yet history shows that humanity has thus far refrained from 
annihilating itself completely. The wars of national liberation, or revolutionary wars, of 
the post-colonial period exhibited the growing tendency of the major powers toward 
limited warfare, despite the inherent political complexity involved in prosecuting it, yet 
this trend confirmed a broad desire to limit the damage to life and property caused by 
war. 
 What follows is a brief summary of the debates. This thesis will close by 
suggesting a way ahead, especially as it concerns further study or continuation of this 
research: 
• Clausewitz vs. Jomini  
The analytic focus on Clausewitz and Jomini often treats them as dueling 
interpreters of Napoleon. While there is some merit to this characterization of their 
rivalry, their key difference was over the role of theory, rather than the correctness or 
error in Napoleon’s actions. Essentially, Jomini used military history to derive principles 
of war, while Clausewitz first developed a theory of war and then used the experiences of 
Napoleon to validate his theory. For example, Clausewitz stated that one could 
legitimately argue that Napoleon’s decision to invade Russia in 1812 was wrong based on 
the campaign’s disastrous outcome. Yet, “his campaign failed, not because he advanced 
too quickly and too far as is usually believed, but because the only way to achieve 
success failed.”379 Clausewitz was suggesting that Napoleon’s actions should be judged 
by their theoretical underpinnings, and not their outcome. As Clausewitz concluded, “We 
maintain that the 1812 campaign failed because the Russian government kept its nerve 
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and the people remained loyal and steadfast. … Bonaparte may have been wrong to 
engage in it at all; at least the outcome certainly shows that he miscalculated; but we 
argue that if he was to aim at that objective, there was, broadly speaking, no other way of 
gaining it.”380 
History, Clausewitz asserted, does not provide a formula that is capable of 
eliminating the uncertainties of war. Rather, history provides an “exercise for 
judgment.”381 Clausewitz’s critique of Jomini’s principle of operating on interior lines 
perhaps best illustrates his differences with Jomini concerning the proper use of history to 
draw lessons:  
Now, we come to another question: whether a set of all-encompassing 
principles, rules, and methods may be formulated for these various 
endeavors. Our reply must be that history has certainly not guided us to 
any recurrent forms; nevertheless, for a subject of such constantly 
changing nature one can hardly formulate a theoretical law that is not 
based on experience. … Two main principles for the conduct of major 
wars have evolved in our own time: Bülow’s “breath of base” and 
Jomini’s “interior lines.”  Even these when actually applied to the defense 
of an operational theatre, have never proved to be absolute and effective. 
Yet this is where, as purely formal principles, they should be at their most 
effective … . Nevertheless, they turn out to be merely special aspects of 
the subject, and certainly anything but decisive advantages.382 
A few years after Clausewitz’s death, Jomini issued his retort in The Art of War: 
Shall I be understood as saying that there are no such things as tactical 
rules, and that no theory of tactics can be useful?  What military man of 
intelligence would be guilty of such an absurdity? … When the 
application of a rule and the consequent maneuver have procured victory a 
hundred times for skillful generals, and always have in their favor the 
great probability of leading to success, shall their occasional failure be a 
sufficient reason for entirely denying their value and for distrusting the 
effect of the study of the art?383 
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Ultimately, the fundamental difference between Clausewitz and Jomini lay in their 
methods of inquiry. Clausewitz used a mostly deductive approach, starting with a 
hypothesis and then using historical events as data points with which to test it. Jomini, on 
the other hand, used a mostly inductive approach, identifying commonalities and patterns 
from historical examples and deriving principles. The tension between these two 
approaches is arguably common to all fields of study, and lends the debate between 
Clausewitz and Jomini a certain timelessness that might otherwise not be possible when 
restricted to a Napoleonic context.  
• Mahan vs. Mackinder 
The important consideration regarding the debate between Mahan and Mackinder 
is that neither categorically denied the importance of land or sea power to the national 
interest. The main difference between the two, however, is that Mahan derived his theory 
of sea power from a comparatively short historical period of approximately one hundred 
and fifty years, whereas Mackinder took a more holistic view of the previous 1800 years. 
Although Mackinder acknowledged that naval power had played a key role in Europe’s 
expansion into a world presence, beginning in the middle of the second millennium A.D., 
he questioned Mahan’s assertion that command of the sea was a necessary and sufficient 
condition for achieving national aims. Mahan, he argued, had placed too much emphasis 
on the Battle of Trafalgar. Moreover, Mackinder continued, Mahan had drawn the wrong 
lessons from the British naval victory. In particular, Mackinder questioned Mahan’s 
conclusion that the Franco-Spanish fleet’s defeat at Trafalgar directly led to Napoleon 
Bonaparte’s ultimate demise on land. 
Mackinder’s pivot theory, which was the basis for his later Heartland Theory, 
proposed that the interior of the Eurasian land mass provided a base from which the 
owners could sustainably project power around the world. In this regard, land power was 
more consequential than sea power. Furthermore, Mahan’s sea power argument had 
failed to account for historical land-dominated empires that had little to no dealings with, 
or need for, naval forces. Mackinder also argued that, ultimately, even powerful naval 
forces derive their sustenance from land bases that receive supplies from the interior. Yet, 
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Mackinder’s intent was never to de-bunk the theory of sea power, especially regarding 
the role of the navy in securing sea lines of communication. Rather, he only wanted to 
keep the theory of sea power in its proper perspective. Ultimately Mackinder was less 
concerned with how to fight a war, rather than in predicting where, and under what 
circumstances, the next one would occur.   
• Bernhardi vs. Bloch 
The irony of the debate between Bernahrdi and Bloch is that they were largely in  
agreement with each other concerning the technical aspects of modern warfare in the 
Industrial Age. Advances in both the destructive power of weapons and the means to 
mobilize millions of soldiers meant that the wars of the future would be characterized by 
unprecedented levels of death and destruction. On a strategic level, they agreed that 
industrialization had created an equal playing field among the great powers of Europe, on 
both a qualitative and quantitative level. Perhaps most importantly, both identified the 
advent of magazine rifle as having the most far-reaching effects on the tactics and 
strategy of modern war. As World War I demonstrated, both Bernhardi and Bloch were 
correct. 
 Their crux of their debate concerned whether or not a stalemate between the great 
powers could be broken, and, if so, at what cost. Bernhardi argued that effective 
maneuver, combined with intangible qualities, such as leadership and moral worth, could 
result in swift victories and tip the balance in one side’s favor. Bernhardi thus believed 
that Germany, despite its numerical inferiority to the Allies at the time, could achieve a 
decisive victory. Bloch, on the other hand, remained less optimistic about the possibility 
of swift victory in a future war. Instead, Bloch predicted a long, protracted conflict, 
characterized by trench warfare and a slow, grinding attrition. During World War I, not 
all operations or campaigns involved suicidal infantry charges across open fields, and 
Bernhardi would seem to have been correct in his assertion that boldness and strong 
leadership were still important factors, even in the era of mass industrial warfare. 
However, Bloch was likely arguing that trench warfare would be the dominant, not the 
sole, method of fighting in the modern era. What was critical to Bloch’s thesis concerning 
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the impossibility of war was the ability of nations to rapidly mobilize and deploy troops 
into a theatre. The consequence of this capability was that any rapid gains made by one 
side as the result of maneuver or daring could be offset by the defending country’s ability 
to tap into its military-age population and quickly replenish its losses.   
 Ultimately, World War I did break out, despite Bloch’s admonitions. In fact, the 
massive destruction wrought upon Europe during the Great War did not discourage the 
same nations from embarking on another world war two decades later. Had he lived 
longer, Bloch might have foreseen the development of the tank, the airplane, the aircraft 
carrier, and, eventually, the atomic bomb, which could have conceivably altered his 
analysis on the feasibility of war. This is, however, unlikely, as Bloch was more 
concerned with the unacceptable costs of modern war, rather than the ability to wage it. If 
there was any mistake in Bloch’s analysis, it was his underestimation of nations’ 
willingness to accept those costs. 
• Douhet vs. Mitchell 
As fellow air power enthusiasts, Douhet and Mitchell predicted that the airplane  
would play a significant, if not dominant, role in the future of warfare. While Douhet and 
Mitchell were certainly not rivals in the debate over the role of air power, it may be said 
that Mitchell took a more holistic view than Douhet. In terms of national interest, Douhet 
seemed to prioritize the military application of the airplane, particularly its capability to 
conduct strategic bombing raids. Douhet believed that strategic bombing would break the 
trench warfare stalemate of the WWI era, and argued that command of the air was critical 
to executing those campaigns successfully. The ability to conduct strategic bombing 
while preventing an adversary from doing the same would, in his assessment, provide the 
nation with command of the air the necessary advantage to guarantee victory. Therefore, 
he argued, the government should focus its resources into building a large air force and 
creating an independent organization to manage it. 
 As a military officer, Mitchell shared Douhet’s belief in aviation as a critical 
component of national security. Unlike Douhet, however, Mitchell did not view a 
strategic bombing capability as a necessary and sufficient condition for winning wars. 
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Rather, Mitchell was more enamored with what he called the “pursuit” branch of 
aviation, which he envisioned as the centerpiece of the great aerial battles in the future. 
Furthermore, Mitchell saw the airplane in more of a supporting role to the other military 
branches, rather than as its own decisive effort. Like Douhet, however, Mitchell believed 
in the need for a separate, independent aerial branch of the service in order to organize 
and deploy the air forces.  
 Perhaps the best way to distinguish between the two men is to note that Douhet’s 
focus was on military strategy and how air power would affect the nature of future war, 
whereas Mitchell was more concerned with the role of aviation in military and 
commercial interests of the nation. While one could argue that Mitchell’s analysis was 
more tactically oriented than Douhet’s more theoretical treatment of air power, it may be 
more appropriate to conclude that their arguments were more complementary than 
opposed to each other. 
• Brodie vs. Wohlstetter 
The debate between Brodie and Wohlstetter over nuclear deterrence strategy is  
unique in the sense that no war has ever been fought using nuclear weapons since the 
dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan during WWII. Even so, the use of the atomic 
bomb in 1945 did not involve a nuclear exchange, which is precisely the possibility that 
Brodie and Wohlstetter debated. Immediately following WWII, Brodie theorized that a 
few atomic bombs were sufficient enough to achieve a deterrent effect. Thirteen years 
later, Brodie modified his thesis to account for the development of long-range missiles 
that could deliver nuclear payloads from a distance. Nevertheless, Brodie’s core 
assumption remained that mutual destruction was the inevitable outcome of a nuclear 
exchange. For that reason, no one side would be willing to risk a first strike, knowing that 
the retaliatory strike would be devastating. Hence, deterrence was automatic. Brodie 
concluded that a second-strike capability that could be delivered in spite of a nuclear 
attack was sufficient enough to deter an adversary. 
 Wohlstetter agreed with the necessity of a second-strike capability, but he rejected 
the idea of automatic deterrence. While a credible retaliatory capability was necessary, it 
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was no guarantee against an accidental launch or a miscalculation. In other words, 
deterrence could fail. Wohlstetter argued that it was possible to harden defenses against a 
nuclear attack, such that it would be possible to withstand a first strike and deliver a 
measured counter-strike. He also fundamentally disagreed with Brodie’s assessment that 
hardened defenses were ineffective against a nuclear strike, though he readily admitted 
that any nuclear exchange would inevitably take a horrendous toll on both sides. 
Nevertheless, Wohlstetter argued that hardening defenses would save enough lives to 
make the effort worthwhile. Ultimately, Wohlstetter advanced the idea of a balance of 
terror as the best means of avoiding a nuclear war. With fear and uncertainty as its 
foundational deterrent principles, the balance of terror would work, Wohlstetter reasoned, 
because each side would be motivated to take more precautions to mitigate the possibility 
of an accidental launch or miscalculation.   
Whether or not Brodie’s concept of automatic deterrence was sufficient enough to 
avert nuclear Armageddon will never be proven. Similarly, Wohlstetter’s argument that 
deterrence was not automatic will also be impossible to prove. One could argue that 
Wohlstetter’s balance of terror model dominated international relations thought during 
the Cold War. Yet, with the end of the Cold War and the decreasing size of nuclear 
stockpiles amongst the major nuclear powers, one could also argue that Brodie’s theory 
of automatic deterrence is regaining some favor as a viable model. Of course, it could 
also have been the case that both were wrong in their belief that the Soviets would have 
launched an attack had they not feared a retaliatory strike. Whether this was the case will, 
too, never be known for certain.  
• Giap vs. Galula 
The fundamental distinction between Giap and Galula lies in the purposes for  
which they wrote. Giap’s writing was descriptive, in that it was intended to explain how 
he had started with disparate guerrilla units, and then gradually built a revolutionary army 
that could challenge a regular fighting force directly. Galula, on the other hand, wrote 
prescriptively, outlining a general theory of counterinsurgency and then deriving a 
strategy with which to prosecute one. Although Giap was an inspiration to many 
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revolutionaries at the time, his primary intent was to capture the particular political and 
military circumstances in Vietnam that had contributed to the French defeat by an 
internal revolution. There is little in Giap’s writings to suggest that what worked in 
Vietnam would be equally successful in other parts of the world. 
 Galula’s treatise on counterinsurgency, on the other hand, was meant for broad 
dissemination. Although he agreed with Giap that the French defeat in Indochina was 
inevitable, Galula nonetheless believed that conventional forces could defeat irregulars, 
so long as the counterinsurgents focused their efforts on winning the support of the 
population. Based on his own tactical success in Algeria, Galula argued that executing an 
effective counterinsurgency campaign was possible, though he warned that the cost in 
resources and time would disproportionately burden the counterinsurgent. As both Giap 




















THE WAY AHEAD 
 In 1996, Dr. John Arquilla and Dr. David Ronfeldt published a RAND 
Corporation report, titled The Advent of Netwar. In their report, the authors warned of an 
emerging mode of warfare in which mostly non-state actors would organize themselves 
as networks and leverage information technology in order to operate in a highly 
decentralized manner.384 Aside from transnational crime, the new generation of 
networked actors might act as less visible agents of a state. More significant, however, is 
the idea that states might act as agents for a criminal network.385  Since the Treaty of 
Westphalia, the power to make war has been viewed internationally as solely within the 
domain of the Sovereign. Generally, this still holds true. However, the Information 
Revolution has increasingly empowered small networks with the ability to challenge the 
monopoly of sovereign states over the enterprise of war and violence. If networks 
manage to co-opt the state, as Arquilla and Ronfeldt suggest, the potential for a 
breakdown of security increases dramatically. 
 The concept of netwar, Arquilla and Ronfeldt argued, is not a new one. However, 
the Information Revolution has fueled the rate at which netwar is becoming more and 
more viable as a mode of conflict with which to challenge or bypass the nation-state.386  
Key to combatting networked threats is recognizing that many societies are becoming 
networked. As Arquilla and Ronfeldt explained, societies can be organized into tribal, 
market, institutional, or networked forms.387  Generally speaking, societies progress 
toward the networked form over time, often by experimenting with and combining the 
other forms. Because of the rapid growth of information technology, it is the networked 
societies that are at once best organized to respond to networked threats, yet vulnerable to 
them as well. 
 The debate for the way ahead concerning the rise of netwar is multi-faceted, 
though a key point of contention will be whether it is state or non-state actors that benefit 
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most from a networked environment. Regardless, governments will have to rethink 
doctrine and strategy to deal with these new threats.388  In particular, governments and 
societies will need to examine the role and utility of force in combatting networks. This 
will be a difficult mental model to effect, since superior firepower has traditionally been 
viewed as the deciding factor in so many previous conflicts. As Arquilla and Ronfeldt 
pointed out, the use of force in the future is likely to be focused on disrupting networks, 
rather than on destroying them.389 In any event, an age of “fighting networks” will surely 
spark a new strategic debate, likely to be as intense as any of the others that have come 
before. 
 
                                                 
388 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Netwar, 18. 
389 Ibid., 44. 
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